Measurement of Cooperation and the Determination of Causal Variables for Cooperation in a Technical Environment by Daniel, Larry Orville
THE MEASUREMENT OF COOPERATION AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF CAUSAL VARIABLES 
FOR COOPERATION IN A 
TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT 
By 
LARRY ORVILLE DANIEL 
-;;:: 




Master of Science 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma 
1971 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
o:f the Oklahoma State University 
in partial :fulfillment o:f the requirements 
£or the Degree o:f 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
May, 1977 
ftts ;~ 
/ 9'17 b 
D1t.f.""M 
CAf I;;.. 
THE MEASUREMENT OF COOPERATION AND THE 
DETERMINATION OF CAUSAL VARIABLES 









This study is concerned with increasing cooperation in a technical 
environment, specifically an engineering work group. The primary objec-
tive is to develop a model that measures cooperation and the strategic 
variables that affect it. Cooperation is established by utilizing 
policy capturing techniques and a regression model is used to determine 
the relationship between cooperation causal factors and organizational 
cooperation. 
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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
A related trend in modern societies is the increased integration of 
previously independent activities into organizations, particularly the 
professions. Many professionals have lost their traditional autonomy 
and independence and have had to adjust to working in large organiza-
tions. We think of the engineering researcher as pursuing his objective 
of scientific discovery independently. Increasingly, however, engineers 
work in large organizations and must integrate their efforts with many 
others. This has placed added emphasis on cooperation for the establish-
ment and accomplishment of organizational purpose. 
Cooperation is defined as the willingness and ability to work with 
others to achieve a common goal. Cooperation originates in the need of 
any individual to accomplish purposes that he cannot accomplish by 
himself and rapidly becomes a constantly changing system made up of 
interrelated elements. The factors that affect cooperation at one time 
may be forgotten and replaced by other factors at another time. Or the 
organization itself may alter these factors by reinforcing, replacing, 
misusing, or ignoring them either intentionally or unintentionally. In 
the sense that they are of great importance within the integrated whole 




Any system, or set of conditions consists of elements, or parts, or 
variables which together make up the whole system or set of conditions. 
If this system or set of conditions is approached with a view to ac-
complishment of a purpose the elements or parts become distinguished 
into two classes: those which if absent or changed would accomplish the 
desired purpose provided the others remain unchanged; and those others. 
The first kind are the strategic variables, the second, complementary 
variables (Barnard, 1938). The strategic variable is the one whose 
control, in the right form, at the right place and time will set the 
complementary variables at work to bring about the results intended. 
But the strategic and complementary variables are continually changing 
places. What was the strategic variable becomes complementary, when 
once it has come under control; then another variable is the strategic 
one. Organizational cooperation involves the control of the changeable 
strategic variables at the right time, right place, right amount, and 
right form in order to enlarge the total output by the expected opera-
tion of complementary factors. In this dynamic environment, cooperation 
must be effective in the sense of achieving organization purpose and 
efficient in the sense of satisfying individual motives. 
In discussing cooperative systems, Barnard describes a formal 
organization as that kind of cooperation among men that is conscious, 
deliberate, purposeful. Such cooperation is present everywhere and is 
inescapable in today's environment, so that it is usually contrasted 
only with individualism, as if there were no other process of coopera-
tion. Moreover, much of what we regard as reliable, foreseeable, and 
stable is so obviously a result of formally organized effort that it is 
readily believed that organized effort is normally successful, that 
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failure of organization is abnormal. 
But in fact, successful cooperation in or by formal organizations 
is the abnormal, not the normal, condition. What are observed from day-
to-day are the successful survivors among innumerable failures. The 
organizations commanding sustained attention, almost all of which are 
short-lived at best, are the exceptions, not the rule. Thus, most 
cooperation fails in the attempt, or is short-lived. Failure to 
cooperate, failure of cooperation, and failure of organization are 
characteristic facts of human history. Barnard states that it is 
inevitable that the struggle to maintain cooperation among men should 
as surely destroy some men morally as battle destroys some physically. 
Cooperation then must be an organizational entity and must be 
managed as such for interests and motivations are as important as skills 
and abilities in determining what an individual does and how well he 
does it. This thesis investigates the primary research concerning 
cooperation, develops a model that measures cooperation in a technical 
environment and determines the strategic variables that affect it. The 
objective of the research is to create a managerial tool and technique 
for increasing technical cooperation in an organizational environment. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Cooperation and Competition 
Cooperation is demonstrated through acts of working together for 
mutual benefit and is often accompanied by a shared or common goal. 
Competition is reflected in acts of striving to excel, often in order 
to obtain an exclusive goal. Cooperation involves sharing, helping, 
and often coordinating efforts between two or more people, while com-
petition includes a reluctance to help or give information, or even a 
withdrawal of support. 
There are a multitude of reasons why a person cooperates or 
competes. Cooperation and competition may be brought about through 
certain types of incentives or goals or through other aspects of the 
environmental situation. An understanding of cooperation and competi-
tion requires an awareness of both situational and intrapersonal 
determinants. 
Cooperation and competition can be confused because they both 
refer to personal motives, behaviors, or the aspects of the situation 
such as instructions, incentives, or reward structures. To compound 
the confusion, there is a third type of behavior, individualism, which 
must be considered along with cooperation and competition. The meanings 
of each of these types of behavior can be spelled out as a motive and 
as a reward structure. A real-life situation can be used to 
illustrate. 
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Suppose a supervisor describes his performance appraisal procedures 
as being based on a curve: 10 percent of the work force will get an 
outstanding rating; 85 percent will get a satisfactory rating; and 
5 percent will get unsatisfactory ratings. This situation represents 
competitive reward structure, where competition is defined as a condi-
tion in which the achievement of a goal by one participant prevents 
attainment of the goal by any other participant. If, in an organization 
of 100, 10 employees have higher scores than yours, you cannot achieve 
your goal of earning an outstanding performance rating, regardless of 
the absolute value of your rating score. Likewise, in a competitive 
reward structure, if someone succeeds, someone else must inevitably 
fail. Deutsch (1949a) described this reward structure as 11 contrient 
interdependence:" the interdependence of participants is mutually 
exclusive. 
In another organization, a different supervisor may tell his 
employees that he intends to conduct a different type of performance 
evaluation. 11 I want us all to work together. Meeting the goals of 
the organization is a group task. If the group clearly meets the 
goals, everyone gets an outstanding rating; if it doesn't, then no 
one will get one. It is possible for everyone to get an outstanding, 
or for everyone to get a satisfactory or unsatisfactory." Here is a 
cooperative reward structure; if one person achieves or moves toward 
his goal it helps others in achieving their goals. In this situation, 
goal achievement is an all-or-nothing proposition. Deutsch refers to 
this reward structure as "promotive interdependence," where the 
interdependence of participants is mutually beneficial. 
We may consider one more supervisor who tells his employees that 
his performance appraisal grading system is flexible. Your evaluation 
is based on the number of assignments you carry out successfully. It 
is possible for each and every employee to receive an outstanding 
rating; however, it could be that no one will receive an outstanding. 
The same is true with any other rating. The rating given has no 
influence upon the ratings the other employees achieve. Evaluation 
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that converts absolute percentages to ratings is an example of 
"individualistic" reward structure, where goal achievement by one 
participant has no effect upon the goal achievement of others. In 
contrast to the two previous situations, goal attainment by one partici-
pant is not interdependent upon another. Thus, the reward structure for 
any task involving more than one person could be competitive, coopera-
tive, or individualistic. 
The motives of the individuals in a group also affects cooperation. 
A cooperative motive is a mutual or shared one; the person who possesses 
a cooperative motive seeks the outcome that is most beneficial to all 
participants. In contrast, a competitive motive seeks an outcome that 
is most beneficial to oneself and most detrimental to the other partici-
pants. In other words, a competitive motive seeks not only to achieve 
personal success but also to cause other participants to fail. A person 
with the third type of motivation, an individualistic motive, seeks an 
outcome that is the best for himself, regardless of whether others 
achieve their goals. 
Deutsch based his theory of cooperation and competition upon the 
Lewinian field orientation and the theory is concerned with the effects 
of cooperation and competition upon small group functioning. The 
following hypotheses were proposed and have been restated for conven-
ience (Shaw, Costanzo, 1970). Their meanings remain as intended by 
Deutsch. 
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1. Individuals in cooperative situations will perceive them-
selves to be more promotively interdependent, and individuals 
in competitive situations will perceive themselves to be more 
contriently interdependent. 
2. Substitutability for similarly intended actions will be 
greater in the cooperative than in the competitive situation. 
(Substitutability means that the acts of one person in the 
group can be substituted for the actions of another; two 
individuals need not perform the same act.) 
J. A larger percentage of actions by fellow members will be 
positively cathected (become attractive or be regarded 
favorably) by members of cooperative groups than by members 
of competitive groups. 
4. There will be greater positive inducibility (production and 
channeling of own forces in the direction induced by the 
inducing agent) with respect to fellow group members in the 
cooperative than in the competitive situation. 
4a. There will be greater self-conflict among members of coopera-
tive than among members of competitive groups. 
5. Members of cooperative groups will help each other more than 
members of competitive groups will help each other. 
5a. Members of competitive groups will exhibit more obstructive-
ness towards each other than will members of cooperative 
groups. 
6. At any given time, there will be greater interrelation of 
activities (working together) among members of cooperative 
groups than among members of competitive groups. 
6a. Over a period of time, there will be more frequent coordi-
nation of efforts in cooperative than in competitive 
situations. 
7. Homogeneity with respect to amount of contributions or 
participations will be greater in cooperative than in 
competitive situations. 
8. Specialization of functions will be greater in cooperative 
than in competitive situations. 
9. Specialization of activities will be greater in cooperative 
than in competitive groups. 
10. Structural stability with respect to functions will be 
greater in cooperative than in competitive situations. 
11. Change of roles to adapt to changing circumstances will be 
greater in cooperative than in competitive situations. 
12. The direction of forces operating on members of cooperative 
groups will be more similar than the direction of forces 
operating on members of competitive groups. 
13. There will be more achievement pressure in cooperative than 
in competitive groups. 
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14. The group force in the direction of the goal will be stronger 
in cooperative than in competitive situations. 
15. Cooperative and competitive groups will not differ in total 
strength of forces (interest and involvement) operating on 
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members in their respective situations. 
16. When the task is such that the production of observable signs 
(participation) is perceived as a means for locomotion, total 
signs produced per unit time will be greater in competitive 
groups than in cooperative groups. 
17. When locomotion is possible without the production of signs, 
total signs produced per unit time will be greater in coopera-
tive than in competitive groups. 
18. Attentiveness to the production of signs by others will be 
less in competitive than in cooperative groups. 
19. Communication difficulties will be greater in competitive 
than in cooperative groups. 
20. Communication difficulties will be greater, even when 
attentiveness is optimal, in competitive than in cooperative 
groups. 
21. There will be more mutual agreements and acceptances of 
communications by communicators and communicatees in coopera-
tive than in competitive groups. 
22. Members of cooperative groups will have more knowledge about 
its active members than will members of competitive groups. 
23. Group orientation will be greater among members of cooperative 
than among members of competitive groups. 
24. Productivity per unit time will be greater for cooperative 
than for competitive groups. 
24a. It will require less time for a cooperative group to produce 
a given amount than for a competitive group to produce that 
same amount. 
25. The qualitative productivity of cooperative groups will be 
higher than that of competitive groups. 
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26. Members of cooperative groups will learn more from each other 
than will members of competitive groups. 
27. There will be more friendliness among members of cooperative 
than among members of competitive groups. 
28. Members of cooperative groups will evaluate the products of 
their group more highly than members of competitive groups 
will. 
29. Percentage of group functions will be higher in cooperative 
than in competitive situations. 
JO. Percentage of individual functions will be greater in 
competitive than in cooperative groups. 
31. The perception of attitudes of others toward one's own 
functioning in the group will be more realistic in coopera-
tive than in competitive groups. 
32. The attitudes of each member toward his own functioning 
should be more similar to the attitudes of other group 
members toward his functioning in cooperative than in competi-
tive groups. 
33. Members of cooperative groups will perceive themselves as 
having more favorable effects on fellow members than will 
members of competitive groups. 
J4. Incorporation of the attitude of the generalized other will 
occur to a greater extent in cooperative than in competitive 
groups. ("Attitude of the generalized other" refers to the 
internal structure resulting from the introjection of 
mutually interacting attitudes of those persons with whom 
one interacts frequently.) 
Major empirical support is provided by Deutsch for his theory 
(1949b). Five-person groups were studied as they attempted to solve 
human relations problems and puzzle problems. Extensive observational 
data were obtained by four observers using formal rating scales, as 
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well as data from subject ratings. The results provided impressive 
support for the theory. Moderate to strong support was found for 
twenty-three of the thirty-four hypotheses; weak or ambiguous evidence 
was found relative to four hypotheses (8, 13, 16, 26); and seven 
hypotheses were not tested (10, 11, 14, 20, 22, 31, 32). Additional 
relevant data have been reported by Grossack (1954), who examined the 
consequences of cooperation and competition on small-group cohesiveness, 
social influence, and communication. He found that cooperative subjects 
showed significantly more cohesive behavior, more attempts at influence, 
greater exertion and acceptance of pressures toward uniformity, and more 
relevant communications than did competitive subjects. Raven and 
Eachus (1963) found that members of cooperative groups solved problems 
more rapidly, evaluated other group members more favorably, showed less 
hostility, were more attracted to the task, and showed greater concern 
about own performance than members of competitive groups did. All 
these findings except the "concern about own performance" are consistent 
with Deutsch's theory. 
Other experimental studies adopting the Deutsch theoretical 
orientation (Gottheil, 1955; Shaw, 1958; Hammond and Goldman, 1961) 
also report results that are generally consistent with the theory. The 
large number of hypotheses stated by Deutsch almost ensures that some 
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will be supported, but the high percentage supported by the experimental 
evidence is unusual for a social psychological theory. 
Since there are such marked differences between cooperative and 
competitive groups, there must be factors associated with cooperative 
behavior that cause these differences. These factors can be called 
attributes of cooperation. 
Attributes of Cooperation 
Two of the most important factors regarding cooperation are 
cohesiveness and reward structures. Cohesiveness refers to the degree 
of liking each member has for the group. Cooperative reward structures 
are consistently associated with increased communication, greater 
cohesiveness, and greater congeniality. For example, in a study 
comparing methods of conducting discussion sections in an introductory 
psychology course, Haines and McKeachie (1967) varied the reward struc-
tures by grading individual versus group projects. In competitive 
classes, a higher level of tension resulted, often leading to a dis-
ruption of the students' performance. The study also showed that 
students preferred being in a cooperative class. Blau (1954) obtained 
similar results when comparing the reward structures in a public employ-
ment agency. 
Certain situations demand that people cooperate with each other 
in a group, while the group as a whole competes with another group. 
This can be called team-competitive structure. Studies on the adjust-
ment of group members (Fiedler, 1967) indicate that intergroup compe-
tition assists group members in attaining personal adjustment and in 
eliminating the demoralizing effects of failure. The men involved in 
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intergroup competition became more cohesive than men in other groups 
and viewed each other as interdependent. To the contrary, intragroup 
competition divided the members of the group and engendered resentment .• 
Thus, intergroup competition~in contrast to intragroup competition~is 
associated with group cohesion and cooperation. A group with a co-
operative reward structure may increase its cohesiveness by instigating 
intergroup competition. This point was demonstrated in the Robber's 
Cave experiment of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961). 
Individual attitudes are another important part of cooperation. 
An attitude may be defined as a positive or negative affective reaction 
toward a denotable abstract or concrete object or proposition (Bruvold, 
1970). More simply, attitudes can be viewed as internal states which 
occur within the individual but which are focussed on certain objects 
in the environment. 
Beyond the environment and within the individual, it becomes 
necessary to postulate what elements make up an attitude. At least 
three have been mentioned, but not all of them by every theorist (Krech, 
Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1962; Secord and Bachman, 1964). First the 
cognitive component of an attitude refers to the intellectual beliefs 
or knowledge that an individual might have about an object. For 
example, one might have a certain belief about the goals that the 
organization is trying to achieve, if the organization is the attitude 
object under consideration. The most important cognitions are those 
which make a positive or negative judgment about the object according 
to some set of criteria (Krech et al., 1962). The feeling or affective 
component of an attitude refers to the liking or disliking of the 
attitude object. Positive feelings might include respect, liking, and 
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sympathy; negative feelings refer to contempt, fear, and revulsion. The 
conative or behavioral component refers to ones policy orientation 
toward the attitude object, or ones stance about the way in which 
persons or attitude objects should be treated in specific social 
contexts (Hardig et al., 1954). The conative component emphasizes how 
the respondent would respond. 
An attitude is not an observable entity but an underlying construct 
whose nature must be inferred. Attitudes possess three central 
characteristics: they always have an object; they are usually evaluative; 
and they are considered to be relatively enduring. A fourth character-
istic of an attitude is often included~that is a predisposition toward 
action or a state of readiness for motive arousal (Newcomb, Turner, and 
Converse, 1965). Rokeach (1968) advances a similar orientation, stating 
that an attitude is a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around 
an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential 
manner. 
By relating attitudes to readiness to respond, it is implied that 
attitudes influence concomitant or future behavior toward the object. 
If we know how a person feels toward working for the government, we 
should be able to predict how that person will behave when organiza-
tional cooperative efforts are required. The relationship between 
attitudes and behavior is currently being scrutinized and reformulated. 
It may well be, as Bern (1970) postulates, that in many instances ones 
behavior determines ones attitude, rather than the reverse. 
Two dimensions of philosophies of human nature that affect co-
operation are trust and altruism. Trust, is the extent to which one 
believes that people are basically trustworthy, honest, and responsible 
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as opposed to believing that people are untrustworthy, immoral, and 
irresponsible. Carl Rodgers (1957) vigorously affirms man's trust-
worthiness and Weigirt (1962) says that man is a creature who must 
experience trust. Rotter (1971) has developed a similar concept to 
trustworthiness, which he calls interpersonal trust. The concept is 
described as a person's generalized expectancy that the promises of 
other individuals or of groups with regard to future behavior can be 
relied upon. The other dimension of human nature is altruism versus 
selfishness~or the extent to which one believes that people are 
basically unselfish and sincerely interested in others as opposed to 
believing that they are basically selfish and unconcerned about others. 
Communication is a prime element of cooperation. In general, 
communication has to do with conveying information from one individual 
or set of individuals to another. This information may be verbal, 
physical, or written and it may convey feelings, ideas, or factual 
material. The two variables which are controlled by the organization 
that seem to be strongly related to the amount of communication in a 
group are the task demands and the physical location of the participants. 
Numerous empirical studies have shown that the way in which people are 
supposed to work together according to the organization chart influences 
their communication. Ilgen and O'Brien (1968) showed that more communi-
cation took place in groups that were collaborating than those that were 
coordinating their efforts or working independently. The organization 
may also facilitate communication simply by placing people physically 
close to one another. Studies have shown that people communicate more 
with people that are readily accessible than with those who are more 
remote (Bavelas, 1951). 
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Two other variables that are related to communication are under 
somewhat less control of the organization. It appears that the greater 
the cohesiveness or attractiveness of the group members the more the 
communication. The direction of causality here seems to be both ways. 
That is, we communicate with people we like and we come to like people 
with whom we communicate. 
The final antecedents seem to be related to the flow of communi-
cation. More specifically, it has been found that in most organizations 
the flow of information is downward from supervisor to subordinate. 
The variable underlying this ph~nomena seems to be status. The more 
status the individual has in the organization the more likely he is to 
be spending more time sending communications to those below him in rank 
or position than to those above. Reed (1962) has provided some evidence 
that this flow may be reversed in cases where subordinates both trust 
their supervisor and feel that he is important for the attainment of 
their own personal goals. This suggests that when the organization can 
select or choose individuals who are trustworthy, they will facilitate 
this type of communication flow (Scott and Mitchell, 1972). 
Another important factor of cooperation is predictability; the 
individual's need to feel that he knows what is going to happen~that 
he is not subject to the whims of forces beyond his control. It is 
apparent that this is just as important when the individual is executing 
a role on behalf of a group as when he is acting for himself. The 
principle of homeostasis, the concern with maintaining a stable environ-
ment, is just as valid here as at the level of simple and routine 
biological adaptation. The importance of predictability is evidenced by 
the tension of not knowing what will happen next. 
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The internal structures of organizations lend confirmation of the 
need for predictability. Organizations with frequently changing 
managers and supervisors are likely to be involved in many controversies 
and difficulties. Changes in leadership mean uncertainty as to what is 
possible; or, if you assume that relations can be carried on as before, 
the new man in the office may react to ~our tactics in an unfavorable 
manner. Conversely, a secure environment makes for goal achievement~ 
with consequent satisfaction and favorable perceptions of the establish-
ment and management (Stagner, 1956). 
Groups strive to achieve goals by following certain norms that 
constitute the rules of the game. Cooperation is fostered when those 
norms are accepted and such acceptance in turn is more likely if the 
relevant norms arise in a large group involving both employees and 
management. It is clear, that if any group rejects the norms of the 
large unit, cooperation is made more difficult~almost impossible in 
fact. 
Group norms concerning cooperation are affected by the process of 
social influence. This process is concerned with the ways in which 
the situation and especially the group norms or expectations of ones 
peers, are related to the patterns and amounts of influence that exist 
in the group. Perhaps the most well-known research in this area was 
first conducted by Asch (1955). In a series of experiments, Asch 
demonstrated the profound effect group pressure has on individuals. 
Asch rigged an experimental situation in which a group was preinstructed 
to state wrong judgments publicly when asked to match the length of a 
given line with one of three unequal lines. In 33 percent of the cases, 
an uninstructed subject who perceived the correct relationship between 
the lines denied the evidence of his senses when subjected to group 
pressure. The independent subject did not know he was being plotted 
against and was placed in the group so that he was the last to state 
his judgmente 
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In conditions where the group is interdependent there seems to be 
greater conformity. It appears that if the individual feels that both 
he and others stand to suffer as a consequence of his behavior he will 
deviate less from what the group thinks is the correct thing to do than 
if only he would suffer (Gerald, 1965). Closeness of supervision also 
affects conformity. In situations where the group can use surveillance 
to check the responses of the pressured individual, there is more 
conformity. The studies cited here are concerned with behavioral con-
formity, not necessarily attitude change. In many of these cases the 
individual may do what is required of him but not really believe what he 
has said or done. The usefulness of this type of conformity depends 
upon the goals of the organization. 
There appears to be ample evidence that people who work together 
and like each other have greater influence over each other than when 
this attraction is absent. Lott and Lott (1965) found that highly 
cohesive groups have both more communication and more influence with 
group members than groups that were low in cohesiveness. Also, the 
degree to which one can deviate from group norms appears to be tied to 
his past record of performance and conformity. Individuals who have 
displayed competence in the past and have conformed to group norms can 
deviate from those norms in order to initiate change or move the group 
in a new direction (Hollander, 1960). 
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It would appear that an individual's satisfaction or morale in 
relation to the group's ability to pressure one to conform would depend 
on the similarity of the opinions of the individual and the group. For 
those who concur with the group, this pressure might increase morale. 
For those who disagree, it should be a very unpleasant situation in 
which to work. 
A major attribute of cooperation which requires special attention 
is motivation. Individuals are not only complex, but also hightly 
variable. They have many motives which are arranged in some order of 
importance to them, but this order is subject to change from time to 
time and situation to situation. Furthermore, motives interact and 
combine into complex motive patterns which affect cooperation. 
Motivation and Cooperation 
Individuals act because of certain driving forces within themselves. 
Whatever the need behind every purposeful human act there is some 
desire~either conscious or unconscious~that prompts the person to act. 
It is in seeking to satisfy his needs that man spends his energies. 
The central problem of motivation from an organizational viewpoint is 
how to induce a group of people, each having his own distinctive needs 
and personality, to work together toward the organization's objectives. 
Thus motivation is an important element of cooperation and is closely 
intertwined with cooperative behavior. 
An individual's motivation has to do with (1) the direction of his 
behavior, or what he chooses to do when presented with a number of 
possible alternatives; (2) the strength of the response once the choice 
is made; and (J) the persistence of the behavior, or how long he sticks 
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with it. The term motivation conveniently includes a number of other 
variables such as drive, need, incentive, reward, expectancy, and desire. 
Theories of motivation may be divided into two groups: ( 1) process 
theories, and (2) content theories (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, Weick, 
1970). Process theories endeavor to explain and describe the process of 
how behavior is energized, how it is directed, how it is sustained, and 
how it is stopped. They first try to define the major classes of 
variables that are important for explaining motivated behavior. For 
example a theory may talk about rewards, needs, and incentives as three 
general classes of variables that are important for understanding moti-
vation. Such theories then attempt to specify how the variables inter-
act and influence one another to produce certain kinds of behavior. 
A simple example of such a process statement might be the assertion 
that "individuals exert" more cooperative effort to obtain rewards that 
satisfy important needs than to obtain rewards that do not. 
By contrast, content theories are more concerned with the specific 
identity of what it is within an individual or his environment that 
energizes and sustains behavior. That is, what specific things motivate 
people? Thus, the content theories attempt to identify and define the 
specific entities within a general class of important variables (e.g., 
promotion, salary, job security, fringe benefits, recognition, and 
friendly co-workers might make up the general class of variables 
labeled "rewards"). The content theories are not centrally concerned 
with specifying the precise form of the interaction between variables. 
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Process Theories 
Process theories may be sub-divided into three areas: (1) stimulus-
response, drive x habit theory; (2) expectancy theory; and (3) dis-
crepancy theory. 
(1) In stimulus-response, drive x habit theory, behavior is 
pictured as resulting from a combination of drive and habit strenght. 
Thus, the motivational process deals with these two classes of variables, 
and the theory specifies that they combine in a multiplicative fashion 
to produce effort (Hull, 1943). 
Habit strength refers to a connection between stimuli and/or 
responses that has become virtually automatic through experience, 
usually thorough repeated trials. So, for example, 11 149211 automatically 
elicits "Columbus" from most Americans; a printed word elicits certain 
manual responses in the skilled typist; a red traffic signal elicits 
braking by the motorist. Habits do not depend on thinking either for 
their formation or their execution; as a matter of fact, thinking some-
times interferes with their smooth performance. 
Drive level was originally thought of as simply representing the 
level of doing without relative to assumed needs such as food or water 
but this was soon expanded to incorporate the need to reduce any strong 
internal stimulus. This was modified again when it was demonstrated 
that men will often strive to increase the amount of stimulation they 
receive (Cofer and Appley, 1964). The current theory seems to view the 
individual as striving toward an optimal level of stimulation (Cofer, 
1967). Obviously, this optimal level may change with time, and Helson 
(1959) has suggested the idea of adaption level to explain why the value 
of incentives may change with repeated reinforcement. For example, an 
initially hovel stimulus may become less novel after repeated 
appearances. 
(2) The basis of the expectance theory view of motivation is the 
idea that individuals have cognitive expectancies concerning the out-
comes that are likely to occur as the result of what they do and that 
individuals have preferences among outcomes. That is, an individual 
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has an idea about possible consequences according to their probability 
of occurrence and their value to him. Thus, for the expectancy theorist 
it is the anticipation of reward that gives behavior its direction 
(Lewin, 1938). 
Building on expectancy theory Vroom (1964) has presented a process 
theory of motivation that he calls instrumentality theory. His basic 
classes of variables are expectancies, valences, choices, outcomes, 
and instrumentalities. Expectancy is defined as a belief concerning the 
likelihood that a particular act will be followed by a particular out-
come. Valence refers to the strength of an individual's preference for 
a particular outcome. Briefly Vroom's formulation postulates that the 
motivational force, or effort, an individual exerts is a function of 
(1) his expectancy that certain outcomes will result from his behavior 
(e.g., a raise in pay for cooperative effort) and (2) the valence, for 
him of the outcomes. The valence of an outcome is, in turn, a function 
of its instrumentality for obtaining other outcomes and the valence of 
these other outcomes. 
(J) The central idea in discrepancy theory is that if a discrepancy 
exists within the individual, he is motivated to reduce it, and the 
greater the discrepancy, the greater the motivation. The discrepancy 
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under consideration is that which exists between two sets of elements, 
for example, two attitudes which do not follow from each other, or a 
subjective perception and an objective reality that do not fit, such as 
believing one is a topnotch manager and then not receiving a promotion 
for a long time (Festinger, 1957). 
Content Theories 
The discussion of the various process theories of motivation leads 
to the content theories or suggestions concerning what specific variables 
should be studied. Accordingly various writers have constructed lists 
of motives ranging from very short and highly general lists to more 
specific ones containing as many as fifty or sixty specific needs. One 
classical scheme reduced secondary motives to four basic "wishes"-for 
security, recognition, response from others, and new experience (Thomas, 
1923). On the other hand, one of the classifications underlying what 
internal states govern human behavior lists twenty-eight "needs". (For 
example, need for achievement, need for aggression, need for autonomy, 
need for affiliation, need for superiority, and need for exposition) 
(Murray, 1938). 
Building on Murray's theory, McClelland and Atkinson have sought to 
refine and intensively investigate a subset of motives from Murray's 
list. The three that they have researched the most are (1) the need for 
achievement, (2) the need for affiliation, and (3) the need for power, 
with the need for achievement given the most emphasis. The achievement 
motive is viewed as a relatively stable disposition, or potential 
behavior tendency, to strive for achievement or success. The motive is 
presumed not to operate until it is aroused by certain situational cues 
or incentives, which signal the individual that certain behaviors will 
lead to feelings 0£ achievement (Atkinson, 1957). According to Atkinson, 
a particular motive~achievement (n Ach), affiliation (n Af£), or power 
(n Pow) is actually a label for a class of incentives, all 0£ which 
produce essentially the same result. This end result is an internal 
experience of satisfaction such as pride in accomplishment (n Ach), a 
sense of belonging and being warmly received by other (n Aff), or the 
feeling of being influential and in control (n Pow). These motives may 
be conditioned to a wide range of incentives and are learned (McClelland, 
1951). 
The above idea of motives is embedded in what is essentially an 
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expectancy-valence model of the motivational process. That is, behavior 
is seen as resulting from (1) the strength of the motive, (2) the 
valence of the incentive which arouses the motive, and (3) the indi-
vidual's expectancies that behavior will lead to the incentive or reward. 
Expectancy and valence are hypothesized to be inversely related, and the 
implication is that low expectancies or a low subjective probability of 
success leads to a higher value for the incentive, and vice-versa. 
Formally stated, the tendency to approach a task with the intention 
of performing successfully (Ts) is a multiplicative £unction of the 
strength of the achievement motive (Ms), the subjective probability of 
success (Ps), and the valence or incentive value of success (Is). That 
is, Ts = Ms x Ps x Is. Conversely, the behavioral tendency to avoid 
failure by avoiding the task (Tf) is a multiplicative function of the 
strength of the need to avoid failure (Maf), the subjective probability 
of failure (Pf), and the incentive value of failure (If). That is, 
Tf=Ma£xPfxif. For any given task, the observed is the resultant of 
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Ts and Tf. 
However, when variables change over a period of time behavior will 
also change. For example, the law of effect states that behavior which 
is rewarded tends to recur at a higher frequency. In need achievement 
terms this would be true only if the value of the incentive remained 
constant. This may not happen if the behavior under consideration is 
prominent for the achievement motive. Under these conditions the 
incentive value of the reward is negatively related to the perceived 
probability of success. Thus, if the individual experiences repeated 
successes on the task, the perceived probability of success will 
increase, the value of the incentive will decrease, and the individual 
may go off and do something else (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, Weick, 
1970). 
One of the most useful models of human needs was developed in the 
1950's by A. W. Maslow. He envisioned five basic needs and ranked them 
in the order in which they are usually fulfilled: 
1. Physiological - the need for food, shelter, and physical 
protection. 
2. Security - the need for psychological and economic well being. 
J. Social - the need to be accepted by others. 
4. Ego - the need to achieve, have status, and gain recognition. 
5. Self-actualization - the need to fulfill ones potential as a 
person. 
Application of Maslow's theory can be facilitated by translating to 
more modern terminology. For example, whereas Maslow wrote about self-
actualization, ego, and social needs, today's managers speak in terms of 
the needs of competence, achievement and power, and affiliation. In 
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general, highly technical people are more motivated by a constant (or, 
at least, relatively continual) desire to demonstrate competence in 
their work. This competence motive is certainly desirable, but it can 
also make the engineer adopt a superior attitude toward those who have a 
desire merely for power or achievement, as well as toward those who have 
the basic affiliative motives. It is the existence of this underlying 
competence motive that sometimes causes technical people to behave in a 
"different" way and to require different managerial strategems to make 
them truly productive (Steinmetz, 1976). 
In conclusion then, it may be summarized that when a particular need 
is active, it may be considered to serve both as a driving impulse to 
action and as a director of activities for an individual; it determines 
what will be important to the individual and shapes his cooperative 
behavior accordingly. This implies that the nature of the job - what it 
allows in the way of opportunities for need satisfaction - has implica-
tions in characterizing individual cooperative performance. Thus, it is 
important to examine how these factors relate specifically to engineers 
and their work environment. 
Aspects of Engineering Cooperation 
and Productivity 
There is wide agreement among behavioral scientists that engineers 
are an unusual occupational group. More than most employees they thrive 
on challenge and flourish on recognition. Although he is concerned with 
his salary, the engineer's motivation for sustained productivity is 
complex and stems from many other aspects of his job. One of these 
very important aspects is cooperation. 
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The engineer's emergence as a subject for study is evidenced by the 
trend of research over the last twenty years. Originally the concern 
of the human-relations people was with the blue-collar workers. Then the 
focus began to shift to foreman and to middle management. Now it is 
concentrated in special areas like research and development and top 
management. Herzberg's theory was first drawn from an examination of 
events in the lives of engineers and accountants. At least 16 other 
investigations, using a wide variety of populations have since been 
completed, making the original research one of the most replicated 
studies in the field of job attitudes (Herzberg, 1968). 
Paul Strauss (1969) conducted a study among 520 engineers to 
evaluate how job environments contribute to feelings of satisfaction and 
productivity. Among the main interesting findings stemming from the 
survey are the following: 
e Supervisors universally see themselves as more satisfied, coopera-
tive and more productive than nonsupervisors. This apparently stems 
from an opportunity to enhance their status, to influence the work done, 
to fix their own work schedule, and to be rewarded more directly for 
their performance. 
e Research engineers appear to be the most team-oriented. They tend 
to see themselves as somewhat less productive individually, but describe 
their job environment in glowing terms. 
e Development engineers are the least satisfied type and describe 
this dissatisfaction as stemming from little opportunity to enhance their 
status, having to relocate too often, and not knowing their exact 
responsibilities. 
e Although design engineers report average satisfaction, their job 
characteristics indicate less than average opportunities to use their 
total skills, influence the work done, associate with able colleagues, 
-and fix their own work schedules. 
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e Manufacturing engineers see themselves as most productive and most 
satisfied. Their job environment, however, is described as offering 
little job security, little chance to work with interesting colleagues, 
and little chance to influence the work around them. 
e Engineers working for the government seem to reflect the least 
satisfaction with their jobs. They reflect a similar job environment 
pattern to design engineers in general, but, in addition, seem concerned 
with the lack of cooperation on the part of their co-workers. 
e On the average, about a third of the engineers surveyed were either 
neutral or actually disliked their jobs, but only about a fourth felt 
that their own productivity was lower than others. 
e Discernible differences between supervisory and nonsupervisory 
groups, type of engineering done, and type of employer were found, 
especially in the characteristics of their job environment, that could 
lead to high satisfaction, cooperation, and productivity. 
From this study it can be generally concluded that, depending upon 
the actual job environment, engineers can be either happy or productive, 
or both or neither. In the long run, though, enhancing the opportunities 
for professional growth and independence seems to have the effect of 
boosting not only a feeling of 11 liking 11 one's job, but the motivation to 
11produce 11 as well. 
Eugene Raudsepp (1969, 1970) surveyed a thousand engineers from 
various companies over the United States, including both government and 
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industry, concerning personal-professional-management problems in 
engineering. Four of the areas of particular interest are (1) what 
makes a man produce, (2) engineers' attitudes toward their jobs, (3) what 
causes discontent, and (4) job satisfaction. In the first area recog-
nition, opportunity, and money emerged as the prime motivators; however, 
a whole set of conditions were introduced. These included the need for 
more qualified personnel, removal of distractions and interruptions, more 
realistic work loads, proper incentive system and specific goals, more 
decision-making authority, and more interest and involvement. It was 
also established that: 
1. An engineer's freedom~to organize his own time, to select and 
carry out projects as he sees fit, to make decisions, to be 
innovative~all contribute to increased productivity. 
2. The promise of increased opportunity provides a powerful 
impetus to increased effort, performance, cooperation, and 
efficiency. 
3. An engineer's productivity at any level seems to be affected 
significantly by the performan~e of those at the level just 
below him. Just as the working engineers say their produc-
tivity would improve with sufficient assistance from tech-
nicians, those in supervisory-management positions mention the 
effect of subordinates. The same is true for cooperation. 
4. Productivity is closely tied to the engineer's own estimation 
of his ability to perform. When he senses growth and improve-
ment in his abilities, this is an indication that his produc-
tivity and effectiveness are increasing correspondingly. 
On the other hand, if he feels stagnant or~even worse~if 
he feels that his abilities are deteriorating, his performance is very 
likely to reflect this situation. 
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The study involving engineers' attitudes toward their jobs estab-
lished that over 80 percent of the factors mentioned by the panelists as 
contributing to their job well-being relate, one way or another, to the 
sense of achievement. Successful completion of projects, accomplishment 
of very difficult tasks, seeing the results of one's work, obtaining 
patents and inventing new products and processes, a demonstrated ability 
to accept any challenge~all are highly interrelated, and all belong to 
the same family of meaning: achievement. Even recognition which was 
mentioned by a sizable number of engineers is based, in the majority 
of cases, on achievement. Two other factors, promotion and increased 
responsibility which were strongly emphasized also relate closely to 
feelings of achievement and recognition. The almost exclusive emphasis 
on achievement indicates that engineers' preponent motivation is self-
actualization or self-fulfillment and that their work is the primary 
area in which their need for self-fulfillment can be met. 
While the factors leading to high positive feeling with the job 
were mostly related to job content, to the actual accomplishment of the 
job, feelings of unhappiness with the job ties in primarily with the 
contextual or situational factors of the job, to the conditions surround-
ing the job. Thus, management inadequacies, poor administration, assign-
ment to routine task, project cancellations, internal politics, lack of 
authority~all focus on the climate or situations surrounding the job. 
Essentially the same emphasis is placed on contextual job factors when 
engineers describe the most difficult aspects of their present jobs. 
As was pointed out in Herzberg's studies of motivation to work, removing 
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the dissatisfactions connected with the climate or contextual factors of 
work do not automatically lead to increased efficiency or productivity, 
nor does it materially add to the individual's positive feelings about 
his job. 
In the third study the basic cause of discontent among engineers, 
according to one-third of the engineering panelists, can be traced to 
what they perceive as low wages. In addition to salary compression with 
the passage of time, the feeling that their salaries do not adequately 
compensate them for the rigorous effort and preparation they put into 
their profession, there is now the added factor of inflation and the 
claim that salaries are not tied to the rapidly increasing cost of 
living. 
Actually, while engineers as a professional group are, perhaps, 
more vocal about their dissatisfaction with their salaries than are 
other professional groups, there is evidence that money bothers much of 
the population, in all occupational groups. A recent Gallop Poll 
indicated that 30 percent of our populace are clearly dissatisfied with 
their income. 
What is more disturbing than the either fancied or real salary 
discrepancy between engineers and other professional groups is the 
feeling that engineers' discontent stems from declining technical 
challenge, misutilization, and uninteresting, nonprofessional work. 
Several recent studies show that engineers continue to have lower levels 
of contentment on general morale indicators (particularly as concerns 
their jobs) than do other comparable groups in industry. In one study 
conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation among employees of a large 
metals company (where relatively high morale prevails) all groups were 
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asked to rate their jobs and the kind of work they do (Raudsepp, 1969). 
These were rated 11very good" by 80 percent of the plant managers and 
assistants, 59 percent of the sales force, 43 percent of the headquarters 
staff, 41 percent of the production group, but only 27 percent of the 
engineers and chemists. 
Another major complaint of the engineers surveyed is their feeling 
of lack of recognition for a job well done or for their contribution to 
their companies' operations. Lack of professional recognition, which 
was a considerable source of irritation a few years ago, seems to have 
subsided. 
Other sources of discontent mentioned were: lack of confidence in 
management, lack of a sense of direction of activities, poor communica-
tion between management and engineers, not being involved in general 
overall planning, and lack of responsibility. 
The survey indicates that engineers' discontent is not limited to 
minor gripes, but focuses on circumstances and problems amenable to 
change by concerted management action. To be sure, some engineers seem 
to have made a mistake in their career choice, and their pervasive dis-
content might not be relieved by even the most enlightened treatment. 
But the problems of the majority of engineers have to do with legitimate 
complaints. Particularly, many of their jobs could be reconstructed so 
they could apply their talents to the full. Supervisors and management 
could also exercise greater sensitivity to their individual needs and 
requiranents. 
Robert D. Best, research director of Opinion Research Corporation, 
feels that the selection and placement process of engineers deserves 
searching re-examination. He says that the problem is to define 
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realistically the requirements of individual jobs in the broad spectrum 
of jobs that the company offers. The next step is to match the man to 
the job by finding out what the applicant expects or wants from the job 
situation. Another approach to better selection and placement is to 
match the psychological demands of the work with the psychological needs 
of the engineer. 
Despite anticipated cuts in government spending and general business 
slack, both the demand for qualified engineers and the turnover rate 
remains high. There is still keen competition for qualified people and 
apparently no reluctance on the part of many engineers to seek greener 
pastures if their job expectations are not fulfilled. However, many 
others seem content to stay with their present companies. The fourth 
area of research showed that the nature of the work~its challenge, 
interest, and variety; its creative aspects and close correspondence to 
what the individual trained for~remains the most important factor in 
job satisfaction. Money runs a close second to challenge and interest 
in holding engineers on their jobs but it must be recognized that 
"challenge and interest" incorporates a large nwnber of sub-areas 
(i.e., opportunities for growth and advancement, opportunities for 
creative design work). 
Other major reasons for staying on the job included not wanting to 
move from present homes; time invested with company; job security; 
pleasant, congenial, and capable associates; recognition, respect for 
technical judgement, high technical and management status and prestige 
could not be duplicated elsewhere; relative independence; fringe bene~ 
fits; chances for promotion; reputation of the company; growth potential 
of the companies; good working conditions; and present level of 
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responsibility. 
Engineers' efficiency, productivity, creativity, morale, motiva-
tion, cooperation~even absenteeism and turnover~are all greatly 
affected by their attitudes toward their work. When a man has excep-
tionally positive feelings about his job, his output and efficiency are 
correspondingly high. Conversely, negative feelings not only sap his 
morale and motivation, but they also reduce his cooperation and 
productivity. 
It is recognized that cooperative behavior is a function of the 
individuals' motives as well as other aspects of the situation. Can 
we say which factor is most influential or how they interact? These 
problems can be studied by looking at tasks that pose choices between 
conflicting motives. The Prisoner's Dilemma is the most frequently 
studied of these mixed-motive tasks. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game is a mixed-motive game which has been 
used extensively in the study of cooperation. A review of this game 
seems appropriate for this study because: (1) there is the possibility 
of clearly separating cooperative motives in a quantitative manner; 
(2) game theory can serve as a model for human behavior; (3) simulation 
is an important way of studying human behavior; (4) there is the possi-
bility for controlled feedback; and (5) much background work has already 
been done using the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 
The situation of the Prisoner's Dilemma takes its name from the 
following predicament described by Luce and Raiffa (1957). Two subjects 
are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain 
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they are guilty of a specific crime, but he does not have adequate 
evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner 
that each has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are 
sure they have done or not to confess. If they both do not confess, 
then the district attorney will book them on some very minor trumped-up 
charge; if they both confess, they will be prosecuted and he will 
recommend a rather severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other 
does not, then the confessor will receive rather lenient treatment for 
turning state's evidence whereas the latter will get the "book slapped 
at him". 
There is purposely created dilemma between motives in the above 
situation. The outcome for each prisoner is determined by the combi-
nation of the choices made by him and the other prisoner. Matrices can 
be developed that represent the choices available to the prisoners 
(Figure 1). The matrix highlights the fact that the outcome for each 
person depends upon the responses of the other participant. Using the 
matrix, the choices can easily be quantified by substituting some 
hypothetical nwnerical values (days in jail) for the descriptive 
punishment (Figure 2). 
In experimental Prisoner's Dilemma situations, studies have utilized 
less severe pay-offs than jail sentences. In fact, rewards have been 
used instead of punishments, usually in the form of money (Figure 3). 
In varying studies, the amounts of money have ranged from pennies per 
trial to as much as 60 dollars for an experiment of ten trials. A 
typical game matrix with money as a reward is shown in Figure 4. Most of 
the experiments use simultaneous responding where each person chooses 
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Figure 2. Matrices Showing Days in Jail in a Prisoner's Dilemma 
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2nd Person Chooses Between 
Blue (Coop~rate) Red (Not Cooperate)· 
3¢, 3¢ 0¢, 5¢ 
5¢, 0¢ 1¢, 1¢ 
Figure 4. Matrices Representing Choices Available to Subjects in Experimental 
Games 
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of the outcome and the other participant's choice after both have chosen 
on each trial. The essential nature of the situation is consistent: 
a choice that seems to lead to the greatest individual gain is, in the 
long run, self-defeating. The most beneficial combinations of choices~ 
if one can assume that the other will cooperate~is cooperation. 
Factors Influencing Cooperation 
When subjects participate in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, by no 
means do they always learn to establish a cooperative relationship 
whereby each chooses blue on each trial. In fact, the games have pro-
duced many varied outcomes. Because of this variation, factors are 
sought that might explain these variations. Situational factors include 
the effects of (a) the reward structure of the situation, (b) the value 
of the pay-offs, (c) the strategy of the other participant, and (d) the 
opportunities for communication between participants. Intrapersonal 
factors include the effects of personality, motivational, and attitudinal 
characteristics. 
The Reward Structure. The reward structure creates a conflict 
between cooperative and competitive choices. Pay-off matrices may have 
a structure which are entirely cooperative or entirely competitive or the 
reward structure may be altered to make certain choices even more 
undesirable. For example, a matrix could be constructed with extremely 
undesirable pay-offs for both players not cooperating. Sermat (1967) 
has shown that the rate of cooperation is higher here than in the tradi-
tional Prisoner's Dilemma matrix. 
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The Value of Pay-Offs. Perhaps the low rates of cooperation in the 
experiments are the results of very small payments per trial (Gallo and 
McClintock, 1965). In the usual experiment, the pay-off per trial for 
cooperating is small (approximately 3 cents) and the difference between 
pay-offs for cooperative as opposed to competitive behavior is even less 
(usually 2 cents). A group of studies supports the conclusion that 
trivial pay-offs result in more competition. McClintock and McNeel 
(1966) varied high (1 cent) versus low (.1 cent) reward and found more 
competitive responses in the low reward conditions. Other studies found 
similar results (Ells and Sermat, 1966; McClintock and McNeel, 1964, 
1967). Gallo (1966) noted the same results in a bargaining game which 
also produces cooperative and competitive behavior. In all of the 
studies mentioned above, the high reward conditions were still quite 
trivial (a few cents per trial). Radlow (1965) increased rewards so 
that the lowest cell sum was $6 (A2B2 ). Subjects played more coopera-
tively under these conditions. Oskamp and Perlman (1965) found that 
higher average pay-offs per trial produced more cooperation. But there 
are also other non-monetary matters at stake~achievement needs, self-
esteem, one's public image. Gallo (1968) has accentuated these symbolic 
rewards and Brown (1968, 1971) also demonstrates the strength of non-
monetary motivations and values in game play. 
The Strategy of the Other Person. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, a 
matching strategy appears to be most effective in facilitating coopera-
tion (Oskamp, 1972). According to this strategy (in which the experi-
menter varies the strategy of one of the players) the second participant 
responds on each trial with the same choice as that of the first partici-
pant. The first participant quickly learns that if he picks red the 
other player will also pick red, and each will lose or get only a 
minimal payment. If the first participant picks blue, he finds the 
other player will likewise pick blue, resulting in a solid payment for 
each player. When the second player adheres to the matching strategy, 
in general, the first player will eventually start making a cooperative 
response in almost every trial (Whitworth and Lucker, 1969, 1970; 
Wrightsman, Bruininks, Lucker, and Anderson, 1967). Reinforcement 
theory serves as an explanation for such a phenomenon; the players 
quickly learn that the other player will choose the same response as 
theirs. Sermat (1967a) significantly increased cooperative behavior by 
using a strategy which consisted of JO consecutive cooperative or 
competitive responses followed by a matching strategy for 200 trials. 
Both groups showed this increase, and in some cases subjects chose 
cooperatively more than 50 percent of the time. Finally, Sermat (1967b) 
found that subjects responded more cooperatively following a change in 
preplanned strategies from competitive to cooperative when they thought 
they were playing against a free-responding partner, as opposed to an 
absent partner or one committed to a previous strategy. 
Opportunities for Communication. The standard Prisoner's Dilemma 
game does not permit any type of communication between the two players. 
They know nothing about each other, although they doubtless make certain 
assumptions. The small amount of evidence available indicates that the 
lack of communication and/or the lack of knowledge about the other player 
inhibits the possibilities for cooperation. An impressive demonstration 
of how communication affects cooperation was carried out in a study by 
Wichman (1970), who varied the type of communication possible. In one 
condition, isolated subjects could neither see nor hear each other; in a 
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second condition, they could hear the other; in a third condition, they 
could see each other; and in the fourth condition, they could both see 
and hear each other. As a result, the more extensive the communication, 
the higher the. rate of cooperation. In another study, Loomis (1959) 
used the Prisoner's Dilemma Game to study the effects of communication 
on cooperative and competitive choices. Half of his subjects received, 
while the other half sent, standardized notes expressing expectation, 
intention, retaliation, absolution, ormixtures of these. Subjects who 
sent or received messages, perceived more mutual trust than subjects who 
were unable to communicate. The level of trust varied with the com-
plexity of the message allowed. The more complete messages resulted in 
higher levels of trust. A number of other studies have obtained similar 
results (Evans, 1964; Horai and Tedeschi, 1969; Radlow and Weidner, 1966; 
Swenson, 1967; Terhune, 1968). Pilisuk and Skolnick (1968) and Tedeschi, 
Linkshold, Horai, and Gahagan (1969) found that a conciliatory strategy 
with honest prior announcement of moves led to higher amounts of co-
operation after subjects had been given the motivational set to maximize 
their own gain. Gahagan and Tedeschi (1968) found increased amounts of 
cooperation if the subject felt he could predict the strategy of the 
other, which was a preplanned matching strategy in this case. 
Effects of Personality and Attitudes. A field-theory conception of 
cooperation would emphasize that intrapersonal factors as well as 
situational factors or environmental states contribute to the degree of 
cooperation shown in a Prisoner's Dilemma. Experiments have shown that, 
in one-trial games, the subjects' attitudes, personality characteristics, 
and motives seem to be reflected in their choices (Terhune, 1968, 1970; 
Wrightsman, 1966). For example, some subjects superimpose their own 
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motives upon the game structure. Even though the task is described as a 
choice task rather than as a game, and even though any references to an 
opponent or to winnings are avoided~some subjects rationalize their 
competitive choices with statements like 11 that•s the purpose" or 
"winning the most for myself is what I am supposed to do 11 • Thus, the 
demand characteristics of the situation are not the same for all 
participants. 
Kelley and Stahelski (1970) have shown that, in the game, coopera-
tive subjects differ from competitors in their beliefs about what people 
are like. Specifically, cooperators believe that people are different 
in their cooperative propensities, while competitive subjects believe all 
other people are competitive. In the study, cooperators and competitors 
were defined according to the subject's self-expressed intent in the 
game. Cooperators were those subjects who stated that they intended to 
cooperate with the other player and be concerned with their score and 
the other player's score. Competitors were those subjects who said they 
wanted to work for themselves, against the other player, and be concerned 
only with their own score. Thus, self-described cooperators and competi-
tors behave differently in a mixed-motive game situation, perceive their 
opponents differently, and differ in their assumptions about human nature 
in general. Not only do cooperators see human nature as generally more 
cooperative and trustworthy, but they also assume the existence of 
differences among individuals. 
In multitrial games, the variations in personality and motives seem 
to have less influence on the outcome, and situational factors increase 
in importance. It also appears that the greater the complexity of the 
situation, the less demonstrable are the effects of the subject's 
personality or motives. Situational factors and intrapersonal factors 
interact (Terhune, 1970). The interactions between the two members of a 
dyad are probably more dominant factors in determining the performance 
on a multitrial game than the individuals' inherent propensities to 
cooperate. 
Other Variables in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
Previous interaction can influence choices in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game. Oskamp and Perlman (1965) found that friendship ranging 
from unacquainted to fairly friendly has no effect on game responses. 
On the other hand, close friendship may produce either high amounts of 
cooperation or competition. 
If the Prisoner's Dilemma Game matrix is presented in non-matrix 
form, more cooperation results (Evans and Crumbaugh, 1966). Also 
subjects who fall behind at the beginning of play cooperate less often 
than their partners who are ahead (Marwell, Ratcliff, and Schmitt, 1969). 
In addition, Oskamp and Perlman (1965) conclude that: (1) the level of 
cooperation is sensitive to the amount of social interaction at the 
beginning of the experiment; (2) previous public commitment to the norm 
that cooperation in the game is desirable results in more cooperation; 
and (J) instructions labeling the experiment as dealing with cooperation 
and competition have no effect. 
Zagonc and Marin (1967) used two-man teams in a game to investigate 
the effect on interpersonal attitudes of winning or losing. One member 
of each team, by way of programmed outcomes, always decreased the 
likelihood of his team gaining points, while the other team member always 
increased the likelihood. The experiment was set up so that one member 
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of each team played one member of the other team, while their teammates 
watched the progression of the game. After a fixed number of trials, 
the observing teammates would play one another. The "winner" of one 
team always played the "loser" of the other team. The results showed 
that successful members had more favorable attitudes towards their 
opponents than their teammates. Pylyshyn, Agnes, and Illingworth (1966) 
found that two-man teams tended to make more cooperative responses than 
individuals. 
Applying E:xperimental Game Situations to the 
Real World 
The mixed motive game has proved to be a useful tool for the study 
of social behavior in the laboratory but does it have any value for 
understanding cooperation and competition in the real world? 
Several researchers have cautioned against applying these findings 
to real world conflicts. Gergen (1969) lists four limitations. One 
problem is that the absence of real communication makes the standard, 
mixed-motive game a highly artificial relationship. (However, more 
recent studies have introduced opportunities for communication as a 
variable, thereby rendering more applicable results.) A second limita-
tion is the ambiguity of the dependent variable. One assumption of game 
researchers, namely, that choosing blue is a cooperative response~has 
not been proven. This seems too simplified an assumption, and greater 
interviewing with subjects regarding the reasons for their choices should 
clarify this point. 
The third problem is the range of options. Under conditions where 
multiple options are available to two people, the processes of exchange 
may be quite different in character. Exploitation in the real world, 
for example, is disguised or covered up by a veneer of helpfulness or 
concern. The creation of opportunities for such subtle reactions is 
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not easily accomplished in a mixed-motive game. The fourth problem is 
the utility of outcomes. This is the meaningfulness of small rewards. 
However, some research findings concluded that game behavior remains the 
same when large rewards are used. 
Pruitt (1967) has also criticized the Prisoner's Dilemma game, 
indicating the following discrepancies between laboratory findings and 
what is commonly known about real life. The first problem noted is the 
lack of opportunities for communication. Second, there is no opportunity 
to try out decisions tentatively and then reverse decisions if the re-
sults are unfavorable. Third, the use of pay-offs is unrealistic. 
Fourth, the reward structure used in the laboratory may not be perceived 
by participants as being the same as the reward structure in real-life 
conflicts. And, finally, the absence of norms in the laboratory 
inhibits cooperation. Pruitt states that in real-life tasks with co-
workers, people may feel constrained by custom to be helpful and expect 
their fellow workers to feel similarly constrained. Such norms may not 
be so easily available in the laboratory situation because of its 
novelty. 
The absence of norms that foster cooperation seems to relate to 
Gergen's concern for the artificiality of the laboratory setting. 
Clearly, the mixed-motive game in the laboratory is artificial in some 
respects. The crucial question is: does this artificiality absolutely 
influence responses? Apparently, the lack of norms does influence 
responses; studies that varied the set of instructions given the subjects 
produced differences in the extent of cooperative behavior of these 
subjects (Deutsch, 1960; Terhune, 1968; Loomis, 1959). For example, 
those subjects who were told that their job was to maximize their 
winnings cooperated less often than those subjects who were given 
instructions to facilitate the winnings of both participants as much 
as possible. 
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The future of mixed-motive game research may lie in the direction 
of determining whether findings from the laboratory extend to the real 
world. Deutsch (1969) claims that the games people play as subjects in 
laboratory experiments may have some relevance for war and peace. He 
says that the peoples of a nation, like individuals in the laboratory, 
seek out and acquire information, make decisions, and take actions; 
and they act in similar ways under similar conditions. But it seems 
that the next step in research is to measure the similarity in conditions 
between the laboratory and the real world. Until such similarities are 
demonstrated, however, the findings of Prisoner's Dilemma games probably 
cannot be applied point-for-point to real-world conflicts (Smead, 1972). 
Summary 
In any situation where a variety of behaviors is acceptable, some 
people will choose to cooperate, and some will choose to compete. An 
understanding of cooperation requires an awareness of both situational 
and intrapersonal determinants. Cooperation is demonstrated through 
acts of working together for mutual benefit and is often accompanied by 
a shared or common goal. Cooperation derives from personal motives, 
behaviors, or aspects of the situation such as instructions, incentives, 
or reward structures. A person who possesses a cooperative motive seeks 
an outcome that is most beneficial for all participants while a coopera-
tive reward structure is one in which the achievement of one group 
member's goal facilitates the achievement of the goals of each other 
group member. Cooperative reward structures lead to more communication, 
greater cohesiveness, greater congeniality, and increased interdependence 
while a cooperative motive is associated with acceptance of group norms, 
social attraction, trust and confidence, and altruism. 
Mixed-motive situations force the person to choose between a cooper-
ative and a competitive response. In a mixed-motive situation, the 
degree of cooperation shown by a participant is influenced by the reward 
structure of the situation, by the strategy of the other participant, and 
by intrapersonal factors such as motives and assumptions about human 
nature. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
The basic research into cooperation has established many gener-
alities that apply to all engineers in various situations. However, 
these studies, for the most part, are concerned with a large number of 
subjects with various backgrounds and do not provide the specifics 
needed for increasing cooperation in a technical environment. One of 
the reasons for this is the difficulty in measuring cooperation. It is 
difficult to assign a value or a rank or a number to cooperation 
especially when a lot of subjects are involved. So while the importance 
of cooperation is always emphasized, the measure of cooperation is left 
to subjective evaluations and comparisons. 
But before any effort can be made to increase the cooperation of an 
engineering group, management must first have a method of evaluating 
present cooperation and the variables that affect it. Once this has 
been established, management can then determine which variables to 
concentrate on for increased cooperation. Expanding this concept, a 
model can be constructed and utilized to increase organizational cooper-
ation and the output of the organization. This involves measuring 
cooperation and determining the relationship between the strategic 
cooperation variables and organizational cooperation. 
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Development and Application of the Model 
Research Group 
To apply this theory to reality, a particular engineering group of 
a government organization was chosen and from this group data was 
gathered concerning cooperation. The group consisted of 102 engineers, 
ranging in age from 23-58 years, with salary levels from $14,000 to over 
$35,000 per year, and work experience from three to 29 years. There 
were ten separate primary functions among the group resulting in ten 
work units within the group. In addition to the 102 engineers, 20 
supervisors, associated with the group, participated in the study. 
Research Model 
Measuring cooperation and determining the relationship between the 
cooperation variables and organizational cooperation requires the 
following steps: 
Step 1 - Establish the measures of cooperation characteristics by 
talking with the engineering supervisors. 
Step 2 - Detennine the rating of cooperation for simulated work 
units using policy capturing techniques. 
Step 3 - Using regression techniques, determine the weights of the 
various cooperation characteristics for the simulated 
work units. 
Step 4 - Determine the level of cooperation characteristics in the 
actual work units and using these actual measures 
determine the cooperation of the group. 
Step 5 - Determine the measures of the causal factors from the 
engineering group. 
Step 6 - Regress the causal factors on the cooperation measure to 
determine the relationship between the cooperation 
variables and organizational cooperation and determine 
the strategic variables. 
Cooperation Characteristics 
52 
Cooperation characteristics are the variables which supervisors 
utilize to evaluate the cooperation of a group. Each of the twenty 
supervisors was asked the factors he would use to evaluate the coopera-
tiveness of any work group. The results are shown in Table I. The 
concept here is that supervisors have specific ideas about what consti-
tutes a cooperative work group. None of the supervisors gave all the 
reasons listed. Some gave two or three reasons, others gave more. 
However, all the factors were listed and included as cooperation 
characteristics. 
Cooperation Rating of Simulated Work Units 
To measure cooperation it is necessary to determine how the cooper-
ation characteristics identified by the supervisors are weighted in 
their judgment of cooperation. This was done by a technique known as 
"policy capturing" (for a more detailed discussion of policy capturing 
see Appendix A). Policy capturing is an empirical analysis of actual 
decisions and provides a mathematical description of a decision maker's 
policy. In this study, policy capturing analyzes decisions and cues 

























GROUP COOPERATION CHARACTERISTICS 
Charn.cterist:tc 
Tact and diplomacy 
Working hamoniously with others 
Considering other points of vfow 
Giving assistance 
Interdependent decision makine 
Ease of communication 
Rapid decisions and resolutions 
Reaching agreements 
Task completion 
Coordination of efforts 
Productivity per unit time 
Favorable evaluation of the group and its procedures 
Cohesiveness 
Positive feeling about the organization 
Recognition of priorities 
Willingness to share information 
Maturity of the group 
Awareness of the total situation 
Recognition of management interest 
Frequency of interaction 
according to their actual influence in the decisions, through multiple 
regression techniques. 
The policy capturing instrument is shown in Appendix B. It consists 
of 30 case incidents of various simulated work units. The 20 separate 
cooperation characteristics, previously obtained from the supervisory 
personnel, which a supervisor might use to determine or measure a work 
unit's cooperation are presented in each case. Each cooperation charac-
teristic is presented at various levels throughout the cases in order to 
obtain an array of data that can be analyzed. The range for each 
characteristic is on a one to five point scale. To present all possible 
combinations of each characteristic and characteristic level would 
necessitate thousands of simulated cases. However, this is not 
necessary. A random sample of 30 simulations representing combinations 
of cooperation characteristics and characteristic levels will yield a 
statistically significant duplication of the results which might be 
obtained by rating the entire population of cases. The random assign-
ment of characteristic level by case is shown in Table II. 
Each supervisor read the cases and assessed the cooperation of each 
simulated work unit on a five-point Likert type scale. The results of 
these ratings are shown in Table III. 
Coefficient of Concordance 
Having established the cooperation rating of each of the simulated 
cases by each of the supervisors, it is important to determine if the 
supervisors agree on the importance of the cooperation characteristics 
or if the agreement among the ratings of the cases are simply by chance. 
This can be decided by having the supervisors rank the importance of the 
TABLE II 
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT OF COOPERATION CHARACTERISTIC LEVEL BY SIMULATED CASE 
Simulated Case Number 
Characteristic 
iJumber 
123456 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 1 3 2 3 3 5 3 4 3 5 4 3 4 1 5 5 5 5 1 2 4 1 5 5 3 3 1 5 4 4 
2 3 3 4 2 1 4 1 4 3 5 4 3 4 2 3 5 1 3 3 1 5 5 2 3 1 3 2· 5 2 1 
3 4 3 4 4 5 1 4 1 3 1 1 5 2 5 1 4 2 4 3 2 5 2 4 3 5 1 4 2 5 2 
4 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 5 5 3 2 2 2 5 5 4 1 2 4 1 4 1 3 2 5 1 3 5 2 1 
5 2 3 1 1 4 3 1 2 2 5 4 4 5 1 4 5 5 3 3 1 2 3 5 4 4 4 5 5 1 3 
6 235324233 4 3 5 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 2 2 1 2 4 4 1 
7 1 4 4 4 4 3 1 4 5 3 2 2 2 3 5 2 5 5 4 3 3 5 3 5 5 3 4 4 5 4 
8 3 5 1 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 3 1 3 1 5 4 3 5 4 3 2 1 1 3 2 4 5 3 4 1 
9 5 4 4 1 3 5 5 3 4 1 3 1 5 5 1 4 5 2 3 1 3 1 2 3 5 3 4 4 2 1 
10 1 1 5 2 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 5 3 3 2 5 1 1 3 2 5 4 3 2 1 3 3 4 3 1 
11 5 4 1 3 5 1 2 1 1 1 4 4 1 5 4 5 4 5 1 4 4 3 1 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 
12 4 1 2 1 1 4 4 4 1 5 3 5 5 3 1 5 3 5 4 4 1 5 4 2 3 1 1 5 5 4 
13 l113223242 4 4 5 3 ,.., 3 4 2 2 4 4 2 s 3 2 3 2 ·1 5 3 1 "-
14 4 5 1 1 1 5 1 2 2 4 5 1 5 3 3 3 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 5 3 2 3 3 5 4 
15 524225332 3 4 1 5 3 5 2 3 5 4 1 5 5 2 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 
16 2 5 2 4 4 5 1 5 2 5 1 4 1 2 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 4 s 3 1 1 3 4 3 2 
17 351235354 3 2 2 s 2 3 1 1 5 4 4 3 3 2 1 4 4 1 4 3 2 
18 2 2 5 4 1 1 4 4 5 4 4 5 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 5 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 
19 215422415 4 5 2 1 1 3 4 5 5 2 2 3 2 3 4 5 5 1 3 5 5 




COOPERATIOO RATU~G OF SIIIULATED CASES 
Simulated Case Number 
Supervisor 
1234567 3 ') 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 13 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1 3252242 4 2 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 5 3 'l 2 2 2 5 3 1 L. 
2 3241252 J 2 5 4 5 3 2 J 5 1 2 4 3 J 5 3 2 2 2 2 5 3 1 
3 3 1 4 2 2 4 1 4 2 5 3 4 3 2 3 5 1 2 4 3 3 5 3 2 2 2 2 5 3 1 
4 324214232 5 3 5 3 2 3 5 1 ... 3 3 4 5 2 2 1 2 1 5 3 I .:.. 
5 324214233 5 4 5 3 1 3 5 2 1 3 3 4 5 2 2 1 1 1 5 4 1 
6 3 1 4 1 1 4 1 3 3 5 4 5 3 1 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 5 3 1 
7 3 2 4 2 2 5 2 3 2 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 1 2 3 3 4 5 3 2 1 2 2 5 4 1 
8 324214242 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 2 1 3 3 3 5 3 2 ~ 1 1 5 3 1 
9 325224242 5 3 5 3 2 3 5 1 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 l 2 2 5 3 1 
10 324224232 5 3 5 3 2 3 5 1 2 4 3 4 5 'l 2 2 2 1 5 3 1 L. 
11 324225233 5 4 5 3 2 .3 5 1 2 3 3 4 5 3 2 2 2 1 5 3 I 
12 32422li232 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 2 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 5 3 1 
13 3241142 4 2 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 5 2 ') 1 2 2 5 3 1 L. 
14 3 2 5 2 1 4 2 4 2 5 3 5 3 1 3 5 1 2 4 3 4 5 3 2 2 2 2 5 4 1 
15 3 1 4 2 1 4 1 3 2 5 3 4 3 2 3 5 1 3 3 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 5 3 1 
16 325224232 5 3 5 3 2 3 5 2 2 3 3 3 5 3 2 2 2 2 5 3 1 
17 J 2 '•224232 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 1 2 3 3 3 s 3 2 2 1 1 5 3 1 
18 3 1 4 1 1 4 1 3 2 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 1 1 4 3 3 5 3 2 1 'l 2 5 3 l .... 
19 J 2 4 2 2 5 2 4 3 5 4 5 3 2 3 5 1 2 3 3 4 5 2 2 1 2 1 5 3 1 




cooperation characteristics and determining the agreement among them. 
When there are k sets of rankings, the association among them may 
be determined by using the Kendall coefficient of concordance W. 
Whereas rank correlation coefficients express the degree of association 
between two variables measured in, or transformed to, ranks, W expresses 
the degree of association among k such variables (see Appendix C). 
Applying this measure of correlation to the supervisors, Table IV 
2 
shows that W = .565 and X = 214.70. From the table of critical values 
of Chi-Square, it is seen that X2 ~ 214.70 with df 19 has the prob-
ability of chance occurrence under H0 of p ~ .001. Thus, it can be 
concluded with considerable assurance that the agreement among the 
supervisors on the importance of the cooperation characteristics in 
assessing cooperation is higher than it would be by chance. The very 
low probability under H0 associated with the observed value of Wallows 
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the supervisors' ratings are 
unrelated to each other. 
Beta Weights for Simulated Work Units 
The relationship between the ratings of simulated work unit coopera-
tion and the measure of cooperation characteristics takes the form: 
where 
Y is the rating of cooperation for the simulated work units 
~O is the intercept of the regression line 
S1 , S2 , S3 , ••• , S20 are the weights of the various characteristics 
X1 , X2 , x3 , ••• , X20 are the levels of the characteristics 
TABLE IV 
COMPUTATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF w 
Coo2eration Characterististic 
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 x6 X7 X8 X9 XlO Xll X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 Xl8 X19 X20 
1 19 6 16 13 2 1 14 20 17 4 15 5 .3 8 9 7 18 12 11 10 
2 19 5 9 16 1 4 20 18 17 15 14 2 6 11 3 7 10 8 13 12 
3 20 8 18 4 7 1 17 19 14 2 16 5 3 10 6 9 13 12 11 15 
4 19 7 13 5 3 4 20 18 16 1 15 11 2 9 12 8 17 14 10 6 
5 17 1 16 4 10 6 19 20 15 8 18 3 5 7 13 2 9 12 14 11 
6 20 2 15 7 10 1 17 18 14 3 16 6 5 9 12 4 19 8 13 11 
7 19 4 10 12 3 1 20 17 15 9 18 6 2 11 (') 5 14 13 16 7 " ,... 
8 20 7 15 3 6 2 18 17 14 1 16 5 4 12 19 8 11 13 10 9 0 
Ill 9 19 6 14 1 9 2 20 18 12 3 15 5 4 11 13 7 17 8 16 10 o.-1 e 10 18 9 13 7 2 1 19 17 16 3 12 11 8 15 6 10 14 20 4 5 
~ 11 18 5 20 2 4 1 19 17 9 . 7 13 11 3 14 10 6 16 15 12 8 a 12 9 12 4 3 18 14 2 19 7 10 5 6 1 20 16 13 8 11 15 17 
..., 13 19 8 15 2 1 7 20 17 18 4 13 3 5 6 10 11 14 16 12 9 
~ 14 17 4 14 2 3 1 20 19 15 3 13 6 7 10 11 5 16 12 18 9 
-;;; 15 !1 1 6 15 8 2 20 9 13 16 5 11 18 3 19 10 77 14 l7 12 
~ 16 18 5 15 6 10 2 20 17 19 4 12 7 3 1 9 8 16 13 14 11 
17 19 8 6 7 16 12 11 20 13 14 2 1 4 18 15 9 3 5 10 17 
18 20 5 15 3 2 1 19 13 12 6 10 4 7 8 17 9 13 16 11 14 
19 19 1 20 lO 4 7 18 16 14 3 11 2 9 15 5 8 17 12 13 6 
20 19 10 16 5 1 3 20 18 17 4 9 11 6 2 8 12 14 13 15 7 
R. 
J 
352 114 270 127 125 73 353 352 287 120 248 121 105 200 221 158 266 247 255 206 
,2'..R. 
J IC 210 -· N 
s "~j - ~·i~2 - 150,366 W= s 150.366 c .565 1/ 12 K2 0~3-N) 1/12(20) 2(203-20) 
X2 = k(N-l)W = 20(19).565 = 214.70 Vl 
co 
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This relationship is in the form of a regression equation and the 
data generated from supervisor ratings of the JO simulated work units 
was analyzed by stepwise multiple regression. This technique enters one 
of the cooperation characteristics at a time until the sum of squared 
differences between the predicted and actual value of the dependent 
variable (cooperation rating) has been reduced to its lowest form. The 
criteria used to determine whether to add another independent variable 
to the existing model was: 
1. The standard error of the regression model must be reduced by 
adding the new variable. 
2. The new variable must add at least .1% to the explained 
variance of the model (R2 ). 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table V 
with the regression model accounting for 89% of the total variance. The 
criteria established for the model revealed that working harmoniously 
with others, ease of communication, coordination of efforts, a favorable 
evaluation of the group and its procedures, cohesiveness, and inter-
dependent decision making accounted for this variance. 
Cooperation in the Actual Work Group 
The analysis of the data obtained from cooperation ratings of the 
JO simulated work units provided the values for the Beta coefficients. 
With the values of these constants, the regression model can now be used 
to measure the cooperation of the real work group since the level of any 
cooperation characteristic can be measured, as it actually occurs in the 
work group, independently of the cooperation rating. This involves 
solving for Y in the regression equation where Y is the measure of 
, 
TAllL£ V 
COOPERATION COEFFICIENTS FOR SilfiltATED 
HORR mI'l'S 
Chari:tCter:Lst ic 
n0 Intercap't of regression line 
n6 ~ase of communication 
n13 Cohesiveness 
n2 Working harmoniously with others 
n10 Coordination of efforts 
n12 Favorable evn_luat:ion of tho group 
and its procedures 
n5 Interdepandent decision makittn 
Multiple corre~~~ion co~££ici~nt (R) 
.. 
C1:11_f_f;l.c:f.~nt of Multipla Determination 
o.z) . 
•All values' significant at the iOOl level 


















cooperation for the actual engineering group being studied. 
Each of the 102 engineers was asked to rate the amount of each of 
the six cooperation characteristics present in the work group on a 
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scale of 1-5 with 5 being the highest rating (see Part II of Appendix D). 
These results were fed into the regression equation and a measure of 
cooperation for the work group was obtained. The results are shown in 
Table VI. The value of 4.108 for the actual work group cooperation is 
calculated on the basis of all data inputs to the model being on a scale 
of 1-5. Thus, the value of cooperation for the engineering group has 
been measured and will be used as the dependent variable in the final 
regression model. 
Strategic Variables (Causal Factors) 
Now that a measure of cooperation for the group has been obtained, 
the cooperation variables (causal factors) that affect cooperation must 
be established. First an extensive review of the literature was made to 
determine possible cooperation factors. Then after evaluating the group 
and its environment, sixteen potential cooperation causal factors were 
isolated. Theoretically, we would expect that the following hypothesis 
concerning these causal factors would hold true: 
1. Rewarding cooperative efforts will increase cooperation more 
than rewarding individual efforts (Blau, 1954; Haines and 
McKeachie, 1967; Sermat, 1967). 
2. A positive attitude toward working for the government will 
increase cooperation more than a negative attitude (Rokeach, 
1968; Bern, 1970; Bruvold, 1970). 
TABLE VI 
MEASURE OF COOPERATION FOR ACTUAL WORK GROUP 
Cooperation Level of Characteristic 








y = -Bo+B2X +B x +n x +B x +B x +B x 
2 5 5 6 6 10 10 12 12 13 13 
Y = Cooperation of the actual work group 
B • Intercept of the regression line 
0 
B2 , n5, ••• ~13 "' Wej.ghts of the cooperation characteristics 









y - -.80557 + .25186(4.186) + .06468(3.667) + .34516(4.000) + .18912(3.567) + .09704(3.550) 
+ .33848(3.617) 
y .. 4.108 
3. Trust and confidence in the work group will create more co-
operation than distrust and a lack of confidence (Rodgers, 
1957; Weigirt, 1962; Rotter, 1971). 
4. Altruism increases cooperation (Wrightsman, 1966; Kelley and 
Stahelski, 1970). 
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5. An accepted leadership style produces more organizational 
cooperation than a forced one (Deutsch, 1960; Radsepp, 1969). 
6. Internal drives that favor cooperation will produce more 
cooperative efforts than negative drives (Maslow, 1954; Vroom, 
1964; Steinmetz, 1976). 
7. Common group goals will lead to more cooperation than diverse 
individual goals (Sherif, et al., 1961; Wrightsman, 1966). 
8. Acceptance of group norms will produce more cooperation than 
rejection of the norms (Asch, 1955; Hollander, 1960). 
9. Social attraction within the group will cause more cooperation 
than a dislike of fellow members. (Lott and Lott, 1965; Scott 
and Mitchell, 1972). 
10. Job satisfaction leads to more cooperation than job dissatis-
faction (Herzberg, 1968; Strauss, 1969; Radsepp, 1970). 
11. A coordination of efforts will create more cooperation than 
non-coordinated activities (Barnard, 1938; Ilgen and O'Brien, 
1968). 
12. Communication throughout the organization will create more 
cooperation than one way communication (Loomis, 1959; Reed, 
1962; Wichman, 1970). 
13. A dependency on others for information required to do a job 
(technology interdependence) creates more cooperation than a 
job that can be done with no dependency on others (Gerald, 
1965; Terhune, 1970). 
14. A pleasant physical environment produces more cooperation 
than an unpleasant one (Bravelas, 1951; Strauss, 1969). 
15. Familiarity with the work of the group is more conducive to 
cooperation than not knowing what is going on (Oskamp and 
Perlman, 1965; McClintock and McNeel, 1967). 
16. Predictability regarding organizational activities will lead 
to more cooperation than uncertainty (Stagner, 1956; Gahagan 
and Tedeschi, 1968; Oskamp, 1972). 
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The information concerning these factors was obtained from the 102 
engineers of the work group by means of the instrument shown in Appendix 
D. The original questionnaire consisted of 80 questions concerning the 
16 causal factors. To determine the actual number and nature of the 
underlying variables among the larger numbers of measures, a factor 
analysis was performed (factor analysis is further delineated in 
Appendix E). The original questionnaire was administered to 72 govern-
ment engineers who were not a part of the group of 102 engineers. 
A correlation matrix was computed from this data followed by an unrotated 
factor loading matrix according to a principal component model. The 
factor loading matrix was then orthogonally rotated using a generalized 
orthomax criterion, including quartimax, varimax, and equamax. 
The factor analysis reduced the number of questions from 80 to 60 
and grouped them into the 16 causal factors (Table VII). The criteria 
for determining the number and grouping of questions was the variance 
accounted for by each factor and the rotated factor loadings greater 
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Cooperation Factors 
Rewards 
Attitude toward working for the government 
















3, 9, 22, 24 
13, 17, 35, 42, 46 
30, 32, 41, 48 
6' 11, 15, 49 
20, 38, 47, 50 
7' 25, 39 
10, 31, 34, 52, 54 
2, 14, 23, 29 
19, 28, 37 
8, 12, 16, 58 
5. 2 7. 59 
45, 53, 55 
44, 51, 57 
1, 26, 40, 60 
18, 21, 56 
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they were originally developed. One job satisfaction question was 
grouped with rewards, one altruism question was grouped with trust and 
confidence, one trust and confidence question was grouped with group 
norms, and one communication question was grouped with familiarity. 
These questions were re-examined and found to be feasible and acceptable 
as grouped by the analysis. As a check, a factor analysis was performed 
on the data for the 60 designated questions with the same groups 
resulting. 
The revised questionnaire was then submitted to the 102 engineers 
in the work group. Responses to items were made on a 5-point scale from 
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Each item was scored by 
assigning a weight of 5 to "strongly agree," 4 to "agree," 3 to 
"uncertain," 2 to "disagree," and 1 to "strongly disagree" if the item 
was worded in a positive direction (favorable to cooperation). The 
weights were reversed for negatively stated items. An odd-even reli-
ability coefficient of .87 (corrected to .93 by the Spearman-Brown 
formula) was found for the engineering group. This indicated that the 
final questionnaire measured with a high degree of internal consistency 
and was an accurate and reliable instrument. 
A value for each causal factor was obtained for each engineer by 
summing the values for each item in the causal factor group and dividing 
by the number of items. This established the separate values of each of 
the 16 causal factors for each of the 102 engineers or, in effect, 
produced 102 independent observations of the 16 causal factors. The 
mean values of the causal factors are shown in Table VIII. With the 
value obtained for work unit cooperation as the dependent variable and 
the values obtained for the causal factors as the independent variables, 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN VALUES OF CAUSAL FAcrORS 
Cooperation Factors 
x1 Rewards 
x2 Attitude toward working for the government 
x3 Trust and confidence 
x4 Altruism 
x5 Leadership style 
x6 Internal drives 
x7 Goals 
x8 Group norms 
x9 Soci~l attraction 
x1o Job satisfaction 
x11 Coordination 
x12 Communication 
X13 Technology interdependence 
X14 Physical en~ironment 
x15 Familiarity 
x16 Predictability 




















the causal factors were regressed on the cooperation measure to 
determine the relationship between the causal factors and organizational 
cooperation and establish the strategic variables. 
The relationship between work unit cooperation (dependent variable) 
and the causal factors (independent variables) takes the form: 
where 
Y is the work unit cooperation measure 
(30 is the value of the intercept of the regression line 
(31, (32, ... , (316 are the weights of the causal factors 
x1, x2, ... , x16 are the established values of the causal factors 
Since the study was concerned with increasing the cooperation of the 
group as a whole, the value of cooperation established for the group as 
a unit was used as the dependent variable. [Because the work group 
established both the dependent and independent variables, there was the 
chance of a response-response bias in the data. As a check to determine 
if the bias existed, the causal factors for half the group were 
regressed on the cooperation measure for the other half. This procedure 
was repeated with the causal factors for the second half of the group 
being regressed on the cooperation measure for the first half of the 
group. In all three regression models, the same strategic variables 
were identified in the same order with only the magnitudes of the co-
efficients changing.] With the value of the dependent variable being 
constant, the value of the intercept of the regression line became zero 
and did not come into use in the regression equation. The same criteria 
as presented earlier to determine whether to add another independent 
variable to the existing model was used. 
The regression model established four strategic variables that 
accounted for 99.8% of the total variance. The variables are social 
attraction, leadership style, technology interdependence, and rewards. 
These variables, with their corresponding coefficients, are shown in 
Table IX. Utilizing this information, management can establish 
priorities for reinforcing the variables to obtain the greatest increase 
1n technical cooperation. 
TAlH.X IX 







I:lultipfo Correlation Coefficient (R) 
Coefficient of Hultipla i.J.:;tcrnin.:ttion 
- (R2) 
*All values significant at the ,001 level 















The present study was designed to investigate the effect of specific 
internal organizational factors on engineering work group cooperation in 
an effort to increase cooperation. Management viewed cooperation 
primarily as a function of ease of communication, cohesiveness of the 
group, working harmoniously with others, coordination of efforts, inter-
dependent decision making, anda favorable evaluation of the group and its 
procedures. The strategic causal factors for increasing cooperation 
were determined to be social attraction, leadership style, technology 
interdependence, and rewards. 
The evaluations of cooperation expressed by management are consist-
ent with those found in the literature. The evaluations of unit 
cooperation were found to be reliable and valid and the data pertaining 
to these factors was highly correlated. In the study, there was high 
interrater agreement among the supervisors concerning cooperation and a 
single regression model was utilized to measure cooperation of all the 
work units in the group. However, for other studies, it may be that the 
best model for one group is substantially different from that for another 
group. This presents no real problem since, if interrater agreement is 
low, hierarchical grouping techniques can be used to cluster the rating 
supervisors into groups within which there is high agreement. Separate 
models can then be developed for each group, taking into account the 
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unique cooperation characteristics important to those groups. 
Also the relationship between some cooperation characteristics and 
cooperation ratings may be curvilinear. This poses no particular 
problem to the regression model. If a relationship is curvilinear, the 
cooperation characteristic Xn will be represented by a new variable 
(Xn1 )i, where i is the correct power term for the curvilinear relation-
ship. These relationships can be fitted to the linear regression model 
as long as the proper power terms are introduced as the independent 
variables. The linear restriction is on the weighting system, not on 
the form of the independent variables. 
Though cooperation was measured by policy capturing techniques, 
any measure may be used in future research that will give an accurate 
representation. Some groups may be measured on quality of work, quan-
tity of work, input-output figures or other measures that yield accurate 
numerical measures. The model can be easily adapted to accommodate these 
measurements. 
The strategic variables identified are a combination of individual 
and environmental factors and represent the areas that management should 
concentrate on for increased cooperation. The variables indicate that 
a greater degree of social attraction in the work groups, participative 
leadership styles, greater emphasis and awareness concerning the inter-
relationship of organizational activities, and rewarding cooperative 
efforts will have the greatest effect on increasing cooperation. 
Social attraction in the work group is related to liking the 
members, feeling that they are responsible, trustworthy and honest, and 
having interpersonal relationships with others in the group. Even 
though management cannot force people to like each other they can be 
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highly selective in placing people in certain work groups and rearrang-
ing existing groups. Leadership style points out that subordinates have 
a strong desire to have constructive use made of their ideas and 
opinions, discuss important job related activities and information with 
management, and establish a relationship built on confidence rather than 
the exercise of authority. Technology interdependence highlights that 
each individual job is only part of a whole set of integrated activities 
necessary to achieve the organizational mission and requires a knowledge 
of the work being done by other people in the organization. Engineers 
too often see themselves as individual or independent workers and this 
has resulted in many conflicts between professional and organizational 
norms and values. Technology interdependence requires coordination, 
communication and familiarity, and reinforcement of this variable will 
have a positive effect on its subset of values. Rewards reflect the 
fact that cooperative efforts must be recognized. While it is important 
to recognize individual efforts, accomplishments in working with others 
toward organizational objectives must be rewarded if the cooperative 
efforts are to continue. 
Even though the strategic variables have been identified~ the other 
causal factors should not be neglected to the extent that cooperation 
will be impacted. Indeed, by altering the strategic variables some of 
the remaining variables may be affected. Management must assess the 
organizational climate that is predictive of cooperation according to 
the situational conditions present within the work groups. 
The instrument used to determine the causal factors was developed 
specifically for this study, i.e., engineers working for the government. 
The questions may be modified without invalidating the model simply by 
changing a few key words. It is not expected that the same variables 
would be listed in the same order for other engineering groups. Although 
certainly some of them would be identical, there may be any combination 
of causal factors that affect cooperation. The important point is to 
find what these variables are. The same is true of the cooperation 
characteristics. Many managers may see cooperation in different ways 
and these may be different from how the employees see cooperation. But 
these differences are taken into consideration by the model and it may 
be applied to any organizational activity. 
The strengths of the research process are: (1) the cooperation 
measures are based on criteria pertinent to organizational supervisors, 
(2) the relative importance of each cooperation characteristic is used 
in correct combination, (3) supervisory biases pertaining to the units 
under their supervision are eliminated since the supervisors do not 
evaluate the units themselves, (4) the engineering groups provide the ' .. ~= ... •· '!., .• ~. '..; ~ ·-~ 
data which feed into the cooperation model and they are in the best 
position to know the degree to which a particular characteristic is 
present, (5) the causal factors are grouped statistically based on the 
engineering groups' response and are not arbitrarily selected, (6) the 
tools and techniques are scientifically sound, (7) the model provides 
consistency, and (8) the approach could prove to be of great potential 
value to the organization in monitoring cooperation and other organiza-
tional factors on a regular basis. 
It is fully realized that the foundation for the application of 
this research rests on several strong assumptions. Foremost among these 
is that the level or organizational performance is a constantly increas-
ing function of amount of cooperation. In other words, the more 
cooperation, the more effective the organizational performance. This 
kind of relationship is shown by the straight line in Figure 5. 
There are at least two other plausible alternatives to this type 
of relat:i.onsh:i.p. The first of these is a negatively accelerated curve 
approaching an upper 1 imi t. This possibility is shown in Figure 5 by 
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a dotted line. It implies a law of diminishing returns-succeeding 
increments in cooperation of identical amounts result in smaller and 
smaller increments in performance until a point is reached at which 
there is no further increase in performance. The second of these two 
alternative possibilities, an inverted U function, is shown by a broken 
line. It is similar to the first except for a reduction in performance 
under high levels of cooperation. Performance is low at low levels of 
cooperation and then drops off again under high levels of cooperation. 
These alternatives, however, would be exceptions rather than the rule. 
The question is often asked whether engineers are inherently co-
operative or competitive. The answer seems to be both. An engineer is 
likely to be cooperative in situations where he views cooperation to be 
to his advantage. Similarly, he tends to be competitive if he thinks 
competition will be advantageous. A similar statement can be made about 
organizations. And cooperation and competition for any organization can 
exist at the same time. More generally, perhaps almost all organiza-
tional relationships can be described as cooperative-competitive ones. 
A typical pattern is internal cooperation (within the organization) and 
external competition (with other organizations) of organizations. Thus, 
organizations have extremely complicated webs of cooperative competition 
or competitive cooperation in their interactions. Both cooperation and 
competition seem equally natural because elements of each are found in 
• • • • 
/ 
Constantly increasinp function 
Negatively accelerat~cl function 
1.nverted U function 
./ 
0 Amount of cooperation for performance 
Figure 5. Hypothetical Relationship Between Amount of Coopera-
tion and Level of Organizational Performance 
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most organizational interactions. 
Though competition or other forms of conflict may be functional for 
organizations and individuals, the more generally desired objective is 
to increase cooperation of organizations. Increased cooperation of 
organizations generally produces gains in organizational productivity 
and effectiveness. The very essence of an organization is that persons 
interacting in the organization do so because they expect the organiza-
tion to provide values they otherwise might not have. A parallel 
concept operates in regard to organizational cooperation. That is, when 
organizations engage in cooperation interaction, they have the potential 
of creating values. Vertical interaction~when a subunit of an organiza-
tion interacts with a higher, larger unit of which the subunit is a 
part~can produce such values. Horizontal interaction~when an organi-
zation interacts with another on its level~also can produce values. 
Indeed, just as for individual persons, all types of interactions of 
organizations have the potential for increasing productivity (Hicks, 
1975). 
There are several implications of the results of the present study. 
First, cooperation is a useful interactional measure. Second, engi-
neering supervisors appear to have similar cognitive models of the 
factors and factor weightings which assess cooperation. Thirdly, the 
causal factors affecting cooperation are interrelated and can be reduced 
to a smaller nwnber. Finally, it seems that management can increase 
cooperation by controlling the cues for the strategic variables. The 
technique presented can promote effective human resource management with 
the result of greater organizational cooperation. Jn effect, it forces 
management to evaluate where they are so that they can see where they 
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are going. The establishment and relationship of the variables evaluates 
where the group is; the manipulation of the variables determines the 
direction they are going. 
Extensions of the present work could attempt to answer several 
questions that have resulted: (1) how do the cooperation characteris-
tics as established by engineering supervisors compare with character-
istics established by non-technical supervisors; (2) how does the measure 
of cooperation of the engineering group compare with the cooperation 
measure of the total organization; (J) how long are the established 
strategic variables valid; (4) is there any relationship between the 
cooperation causal factors for government engineers and industry 
engineers; and (5) how much is cooperation increased by reinforcing the 
strategic variables. This type of research would be an asset in meeting 
the challenge of increasing human effectiveness, realizing the advantage 
in channeling human talent and energy into constructive outlets. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to develop a model that measures 
cooperation in a technical environment and the strategic variables that 
affect it. Cooperation was defined as the willingness and ability to 
work with others to achieve a common goal. Twenty engineering super-
visors and 174 government engineers took part in the study. One 
hundred and two of the engineers served as the population sample and 
72 participated in research instrument validation. To measure coopera-
tion, 20 engineering supervisors rated 30 simulated work units for 
cooperation. The cooperation of the real work group of 102 engineers 
was then determined and cooperation causal factors were regressed on 
this measure of cooperation to detennine the strategic variables. 
The ratings for the 30 simulated cases utilized the technique of 
"policy capturing". Using these ratings as the dependent variable and 
the cooperation characteristics of the simulated work units as the 
independent variables, the coefficients for the cooperation character-
istics were obtained. The Kendall coefficient of concordance W for 
agreement on the importance of the characteristics was significant using 
a X2 statistic. Ease of communication, cohesiveness, working harmoni-
ously with others, coordination of efforts, interdependent decision 
making, and a favorable evaluation of the group and its procedures 
accounted for 89% of the variance of the cooperation measure in the 
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simulated units. The value of cooperation in the actual work group was 
obtained by solving the regression equation utilizing the simulated 
characteristic weights and the group levels of the characteristics. 
Sixteen causal factors were hypothesized to account for the level 
of cooperation in the work group. An instrument consisting of 80 
questions concerning these 16 factors was administered to 72 engineers 
for validation. A factor analysis was performed reducing the number of 
questions to 60 and combining the questions into factor groups. The 
revised questionnaire was administered to the 102 engineers of the work 
group to obtain the values for the causal factors. With the value 
obtained for work unit cooperation as the dependent variable and the 
values obtained for the causal factors as the independent variables, the 
causal factors were regressed on cooperation to determine the relation-
ship between them. Social attraction, leadership style, technology 
interdependence, and rewards were determined to be the strategic 
variables for increasing technical cooperation. The variables were 
highly correlated and had a significant coefficient of multiple 
determination (R2 ). 
The major implications of the present results were seen to be: 
(1) cooperation is a useful interactional measure; (2) engineering 
supervisors appear to have similar cognitive models of the factors and 
factor weightings which assess cooperation; (3) the causal factors 
affecting cooperation are interrelated and can be reduced to a smaller 
number; and (4) management can increase cooperation by controlling the 
cues for the strategic variables. The technique presented was seen as 
promoting effective human resource management with the result of greater 
organizational cooperation. 
Extensions of the work suggested for further research based on 
questions raised by the present results were: (1) how do the coopera-
tion characteristics as established by engineering supervisors compare 
with characteristics as established by non-technical supervisors; 
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(2) how does the measure of cooperation of the engineering group compare 
with the cooperation measure of the total organization; (3) how long are 
the established strategic variables valid; (4) is there any relationship 
between the cooperation causal factors for government engineers and 
industry engineers; and (5) how much is cooperation increased by rein-
forcing the strategic variables. 
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Techn{cal management personnel often must base judgments and deci-
sions upon complex arrays of information. If they could state 
explicitly how they used this information, these decision makers~and 
others~could replicate these judgments in subsequent situations in which 
the same types of information are available. As a rule, however, mana-
gers cannot explain precisely how they use information to reach their 
decisions. 
If it is poasible to obtain al1l the information available to 
decision makers and an adequate sample of their decisions, we usually can 
formulate a regression model that satisfactorily accounts for the 
decisions. Although this model may not use the items of information in 
the same way as the human judges, it may be said to simulate their 
decision-making policy, for it leads to decisions similar to those in the 
sample. Once the model is formulated, we can use it to obtain innumerable 
decisions without the variability that results from fatigue and other 
factors that may affect human judgments. Furthermore, if the model 
predicts the sample of decisions accurately, it seems reasonable to use 
it to predict other judgments that would be reached in similar situations 
in which the same items of information are available. 
Since the regression equation may adequately simulate the judgment 
process, this concept can be extended to measure cooperation. Mahoney 
and Weitzel (1969), Mahoney and Frost (1974), and Hitt and Morgan (1975) 
have found that global effectiveness assessments made by supervisors are 
valid and reliable. It is reasonable that the same results apply to 
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coop~ration. Thus, if supervisors are able to make evaluations of unit 
cooperation that are reliable and valid, then supervisors must possess a 
cognitive model of the factors and factor weightings which assess cooper-
ation. If these cognitive models can be "captured," and actual data 
pertaining to these factors can be obtained in a more objective manner, 
not only can cooperation be measured but supervisory biases which 
distort the models can be eliminated. The process for doing this is 
formally termed "policy capturing". 
Capturing judgment policies for officer promotion boards (Christal, 
1969), for citizen participation in planning (Stewart and Gelbard, 1972), 
for bank loan decisions (Wilsted, Hendrick, and Stewart, 1973), and for 
performance appraisals (Taylor and Wilsted, 1974) are examples of the 
application of policy capturing models. The postulate is that when 
individuals must evaluate other things or make a decision, an underlying 
judgment policy (cognitive model) governs the way each person integrates 
the various pertinent items of information or variables into a single 
judgment. In the measurement of cooperation, this involves discovering 
the characteristics of cooperation considered by technical supervisors, 
and determining how these characteristics are weighted in supervisory 
judgements of cooperation. 
This could be accomplished by having supervisors rate the coopera-
tion of several work units for which cooperation characteristics were 
measured and available. Using the ratings of cooperation as the depen~ 
dent variable, and the measures of the cooperation characteristics as 
independent variables, multiple linear regression could be used to deter-
mine which characteristics had been used in the ratings, as well as the 
weighting factors of those characteristics. The main difficulty of this 
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approach is the time it would take for the supervisors to acquaint them-
selves with unfamiliar work units in order to make measurements of the 
characteristics, especially since several different units would have to 
be evaluated by each supervisor. 
Therefore, instead of rating actual operating units, samples can be 
created by ascribing measures of cooperation characteristics to simulated 
work units. It can be demonstrated that exactly the same results 
(regression equations) will be obtained using simulated cases as real 
conditions, ·provided t~o conditions are met. First, every case generated 
must be conceivable to the supervisor rater. Second, the scores must be 
ascribed in a manner which assures reasonable variance for each coopera-





The purpose of this exercise is to obtain your evaluation (rating) of the 
cooperation of 30 simulated engineering work groups. Various information 
that might be helpful to you in your determination of each group's coopera-
tiveness is presented to assist in your evaluation. It is expected that a 
"cooperative" group will be considerably different from a "non-cooperative" 
group in terms of the information presented. The information in the cases 
presented here varies widely from case to case making it likely that a good 
spread of cooperative, partially coop~rative, and non-cooperative groups 
have been included. · 
Instructions. Assume that a management review has been performed of each 
of the 30 groups represented in the simulated cases. The data collected is 
in the form of five-point scales (from low to high) which are marked by 
management to reflect their analysis of each separate activity (factor). 
Please read each case, considering th~ information presented on the particu-
lar group and record your evaluation of that group's cooperation on the 
five-point evaluation scale following the report. There are 30 cases so 
do not spend a great amount of time on any one, but do consider all the 
information before recording your judgment. 
Example. If you felt one group depicted was particularly non-cooperative, 
you would place an X in the left blank: 
non-
cooperative _x_ 
1 2 3 4 5 
very 
cooperative 
If you felt another group was especially cooperative, you would place an X 
in the right blank: 
non-
cooperative 











(1) Tact and diplomacy of the 

















group , . • • • • • • 
Working harmoniously with 
others. . . • • • • • . 
Considering other points of 
view. • • • • • • 
Giving assistance • • 
Interdependent decision 
making. • • • • , , 
Ease of communication • 
Rapid decisions and resolu-
tions • • • 
Reaching agreements 
Task completion • • • 










. t::::t r::::l 
_.t=J_ :,o 
Productivity per unit time •• q. Cl 
Favorable evaluation of the 
group and its procedures ••• c:J a 
Cohesiveness. . c::J t=l. 
Positive feeling about the • ·r-r. . ...,__.,...__  .· 
organization. , • • • • • r-----' 1........-.1 
Recognition of priorities •• d r::::t 
Willingness to share infor-
mation •• 
Maturity of the group 
(18) Awareness of the total situa-r---""'I r----1. 
tion . • . • • • • • • . . • • L--..J 1-----J 
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Moderately 
Average High High 








































CJ p w · . ·. :p 
r--'f . .,,...-1 




Low Low Average High High 
1 2 3 4 5 
(19) Recognition of management . c:l t::J t:::t b t::l interest. . . . . . . . . 
(20) Frequency of interaction. . .d \::j ·t=t t::) CJ 
Based upon the information presented above and upon your experience and knowledge, 
please rate the cooperation of this work group on the following scale by placing 
an X in the appropriate space: · 
non-
cooper at i ve 




THE KENDALL COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE 
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THE KENDALL COEFFICIENT OF CONCORDANCE 
As a solution to the problem of aecertaining the overall agreement 
among k sets of rankings. it might seem-~easonable to find the r 's s 
between all possible pairs of the rankings and then compute the average 
of these cpeffieients to determine the overall association. In following 
99 
such a procedure,(~) rank ce>rrelation coefficients would need to be computed. 
Unless k were very small, such a procedure would be extremely tedious. 
The computation of W is ·much simpler and W bears a linear relation to 
the average rs ta~e.~ over all groups. Denoting the average value of the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the(:~~possible pairs of 
rankings as r 58v then 
kW• 1 
k - 1 
·' Another approach would be to imagine how the data uould look if there 
were no agreement among the several sets of rankings, and then to imagine 
how it would look if there were perfect agreement among the several sets. 
The coefficient of concordance would then be an index of the divergence of 
the actual agreement shown in the data from the maximum possible (perfect) 
agreement. Very roughly speaking, W is just such a coefficient. 
Suppose three .supervisors are asked to rank six variables separately 
~n their order of importance for evaluating cooperation. The three independent 
jets of ranks given by supervisors 'l, Y, and Z to variables a through f 
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a b c d e f 
Engineer x 1 6 3 2 5 4 
Engineer y 1 5 6 4 2 3 
Engineer z 6 3 2 5 4 1 
Rj 8 14 11 11 11 8 
The bottom rOW' of the table labeled Rj• gives the sums of the ranks assigned 
to each variable. 
Now if the three supervisors had been in perfect agreement about the 
variables, i.e., if they had each ranked the six variables in the same order, 
then one variable would have received three ranks of 1 and thus, its sum of 
ranks, R., would be 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 = k. The variable which all supervisors 
J 
designated as the runner-up would have R. = 2 + 2 + 2 = 6 = 2k. The least 
J 
important variable would have R. = 6 + 6 + 6 = 18: ~ Nk. In fact, with 
J 
perfect agreement among the engineers, the various sums of ranks, Rj, would 
be these: 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 though not necessarily in'·that order. In 
general, when there is perfect agreement among k sets of rankings, the series: 
k, 2k, 3k, .•• , Nk, for the Rj' is obtained. 
On the other hand, Lf there had been no agreement among the three 
supervisors, then the various Rj~s would be approximately equal. 
From this example, it should be clear that the degree of agreement 
among the k judges is reflected by the degree of variance among the N sums 
of ranks, W, the coefficient of concordance, is a function of that degree 
of variance. 
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To compute W- the sum of the ranks, R., in each column of a k x N table 
J 
is found. 
of the R •• 
J 
mean value. 
Then tb:e Rj is summed and divided by Nto obtain the.mean value 
Each of the Rj may the~ be expressed as a deviation from the f 
(It has been shown above that the larger are these deviations, 
the greater is the degree of association among tpe k sets of ranks.)· Finally, 
s, the sum of the squares of these deviations, is found. Knowing these 
values, the value of W may be computed by: 
Where 
W·= s 
1/12 kz N:3 - N 
' s = sum of sq·uares of the observed deviations 
s = 
f~i <'e :•f of Rj, that is, 
~ \Rj •N/ 
k =number of sets of rankings, e.g., the number of judges. 
N = number of entities (objects or individuals) ranked. 
maximum possible sum of the squared deviations, i.e., the 
sum s which wru ld occur with perfect agreement among k rankings. 
One difference between the W and the rs methods of expressing 
av 
agreement among k rankings is that r may take values between -1 and +l, 
Sav 
whereas W may take values only between 0 and +l. The reason that W cannot 
be negative is that when more than t.wo sets of ranks are involved, the 
rankings cannot all disagree completely. For example, i.f judge X and judge 
Y are in disagreement, and judge X is also in disagreement with judge Z, 
then judges Y. and Z must agree. That is, when more than two judges are 
involved, agreement and disagreement are not symmetrical opposites. k judges 
may c1.ll agree, but they cannot all di.sagree completely. Therefore, W must 
be zero or positive. 
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'lhe method for determining whether the observed value t' is significantly 
different from zero, for N greater than 7, involves computing a value of y,.2 
from the formula '1?' = k(N - 1) W whose significance, for df = N - 1, may be 
tested by reference to a table of critical values of Chi Square. (Siegel 1956) 
APPENDIX D 
CAUSAL FACTOR INSTRUMENT 
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CAUSAL FACTOR INSTRUMENT 
1. This questionnaire is being utilized to gather and evaluate informa-
tion concerning organizational activities at MICOM. 
2. Please read each statement and give the answer that shows how you 
feel about it. If you do not find the exact answer that fits your case, 
use the one that is closest to it. 
3. There are five possible answers to choose from to indicate your 
thinking about each question. Remember, the accuracy of your description 
depends on your being straightforward in answering this questionnaire. 
You will not be identified with your answers. 
4. Questions are answered by marking the appropriate answer spaces as 
illustrated in this example. Mark each statement (X) whether you 
strongly agree (SA), agree (A), are uncertain (U), disagree (D), or 
strongly disagree (SD). 
~XAMPLE: For instance, if you felt strongly that your job requirements 
were very clear you would mark: 
SA f:. Q Q. .§Q. 
Job requirements are very clear ••• (X) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
5. There are no right or wrong answers, only your opinion. 
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.§! A !!. Q. sn . 
1. I frequently discuss the work of my co- ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,. 
workers with them • . . • . . 
2. I like tl)e. people I work with • . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' 
3. Individual ·effort is rewarded more 
often than,group effort in my work 
group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
4. There is.no opportunity for participa-
tion in th6 setting of goals. . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
5. There is much interaction and communi-
cation in my work group • . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
6. I enjoy helping people when I can be of 
assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
7. Working together is more important than 
individual effort in accomplishing tasks ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
8. Communication is not very accurate and 
timely. . • . • • . . . . . . . . • . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
9. Individual accomplishment is an imp or-
tant rating factor in evaluating my 
performance . . . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
10. My general interests and attitudes are 
different from those of my fellow 
workers • . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
11. Willingness to help others is an impor-
tant individual trait • . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
12. The ~irection of coumunicati.on flow is 
througHout ~he organization, not just 
up· and down • • • • '• • ~ • • • 1 • 
13. I would not recommend Qovernment 
service as a career to.my friends . . . 
14. The people with whom I wrk sometimes 
seem unreasonable in their dealings 
with me · ••••• 
15. It is important to be unselfish and 
sincerely interested in others ••• 
16. In my work group, communications are 
usually accepted by subordi~tes. 
17.. The experience yQu g~~ in working for a 
private employer is worth more ~han 
experience in a Government job.1 •• . . 
18. My job will be required as long'. as 
there is work to be done •• . . . . . 
19. I like my present job . . . . 
20. Management behaves so that subordinates 
feel free to discuss important things 
about their jobs with them. • 
21. I generally do not "know what to 
expect" • • • 
22. The rewards I receive reflect my 
accomplishments in working with others 
toward organizational objectives •••• 
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() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
• 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i-
() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
< > c > < > < > c· > 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
23. People are basically trustwortqy, 
QOnest and ,r&eponsible. • • • • • . . . 
24. I am paid an adequate salary for. the 
job I perform • • • • 
25. I enjoy participating in activities 
which reward individual excellence more 
than participating in activities which 
reward group accomplishments •••••• 
26. I generally receive a lot of messages 
or communication from others •••••• 
27. There needs to be more communication 
between superiors and suborqinates in 
my work group • • 
28. I derive a lot of satisfaction from my 
work. . . . • . . 
29. I have meaningful interpersonal rela-
tionships with others in my work group. 
30. Trust and confidence in my co-workers 
are important factors to me • • • • • • 
31. I have made real and lasting friends 
among my working associates 
32. It is not important to have trust in 
superiors 
33. It is necessary for the group to work 
together to accomplish organizational 
goals . . . . . . . . . . · . · · • • · 
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A 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
() () () () () 
() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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§.! ! Y. Q .§!?. 
34. There are conflicting values in my 
work group. .. ~ . • . • . • . . . . • . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
35. The good peints about the jobs, in 
Government services are greater than 
the bad points. • . . . . tl • . ( ) ( ) (. ) ( ) ( ) 
36. Within my work group there are few 
common goals. . . . • . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
~- i 37. I dis like :my job more than most people. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ·" I 
as. Management does not willingly share ,, 
-• 
information with subordinates .. -· • ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
t~. 39. I would rather work with a group on a 
project than to work on my own. . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
40. I know enough about my co-workers' task 
achievement to evaluate their compe-
tency • . • . . • • • . • • . • . • . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
41. My co-workers can be relyed on in most 
situations. . • . • . . . . • . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) . ( ) ( ) 
42. The Government is one of the best 
employers to work for . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
43. Mutual goals are more encouraged by the 
organization th~n individual excellence ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
44. My desk is located too close to my co-
workers . • . . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
45. The task assigned to ip.e is part of a 
whole set of tasks rather than an 
independent effort. . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
46. Given a choice between working for the 
Government and private employment, I 
would choose the Government job • 
47. Management generally tries to get sub-
ordinates' ideas and opinions and make 
constructive use of them. • • • • • • • 
48. I have a high regard for the interests 
of others • • • • • • . • • . • • • 
49. If someone genuinely needed help, I 
would do so even though it might be 
inconvenient for me at the time • • 
50. Management relies more on mutual 
confidence and good relationships with 
people rather than on the exercise of 
authority to get things done. • • • • • 
51. My supervisor usually keeps the door to 
his office closed 
52. My co-workers are not very responsible. 
53. My job is only part of a whole set of 
integrated activities necessary to 
achieve the organizational mission. 
54. There is real cohesiveness in my work 
group . . • • • . . . 
55. My job could not be done if I had no 
knowledge of the work being done by 
other people in the organization. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) 




( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
() () () () () 
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§! b. 1! :Q. fil! 
56. There is constantly changing leader-
ship in my organization • . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
57. I consider my work surroundings to be 
pleasant. . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
58. There are frequent group coordinative 
meetings in my unit • . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
59. I spend a lot of time talking with my 
co-workers about task related matters • ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
60. I am familiar with the work of my 
co-workers. . . . . . . . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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PART II 
On a scale Qf l to 5, with 5 being the highest value, rate the level of 
each of the following characteristics in your work gr,)Up. 
EXAMPLE: For instance, if you felt that ease of communication ifas 
always present in your work group you would mark: 
l 2 3 ! 5 
Ease of co~unication . . . . . . . . . . . • ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (X) 
.! 2 3 4 2 
1. Working harmoniously with others. . • • . ( ) ( ) ( ) () ( ) 
2. Ease of connnunication • ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
3. Coordination of efforts • . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
4. A favorable evaluation of the group and 
its procedures. . . . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
5. Cohesiveness. . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 






Facto?' analys_is is an extremely powerfu.i and useful approach to 
behavioral data, one that can help solve intr~ctable research problems. 
Factor analysis is a method for determining the number and nature of the 
underlying variables among larger number of 111easures. More succintly, 
it is a method for determining k underlying variables (factors) from n 
~ . 
sets of meas.urea, k being less than n. It may also be called a method 
for extracting common factor varian~es from ~ets of measures. 
Factor analysis serves the ca~e of scientific parsimony. It 
redudes the multiplicity of tests and measures to greater simplicity. 
' , 
It tells us• in effect, what tes.ts or rneasur~s belong together--which 
ones virtually measure the same thing, in other words, and how much they 
do so. It thus reduces the number of variables with which the researcher 
must cope. It also helps the rese~cher locate and identify unities 
or fundamental properties underlying tests and measures. 
After tests are administered and scored, coefficients of correla-
tion are calculated between each test and every other test. The 
coefficients are then presented in a correlation matrix. The problem 
can be expressed in two questions: How many underlying variables, or 
factors, are there? What are the factors? They are presumed to be 
underlying unities behind the test performances reflected in the correla-
tion coefficients. If two or more tests are substantialiy correlated, 
then the tests share variance. They have common factor variance. They 
are measuring something in common. 
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One of the final -outcomes· of ·a."·fact~r·· ~iiy~is is called a factor 
matrix, a table of coefficients that express the relations between the 
tests and the underlying factors. ·The entr!,es in the table are called 
factor loadings. They can be written aij, meaning the loading a of 
test i on factor j. Factor loadings are not, hard to ,inte:rpret. They 
ranr,e from -1.00 through O to +1.00, like correlation coefficients. 
They are interpreted similarly. In short, they express the correlations 
between the tests and the factors. 
Unfort~nately, there is no generally aqcepted standard error of 
factor loadings. A crude rule is to use the standard error of r, or 
easier, to find the r that is significant fC>it' the N of the study, For 
example,. with N = 200 an r of about .18 is s:.tgnificant at the • 01 level. 
Some factor analysts in some studies do not bother with loadings less 
than • 30, or even • 1~0. Other do. The use of l/ N as the standard 
error of factor loadings is also used, Whatever formula or method used 
r.mst be used with circumspection. 
There are a number of methods· of factor analyzing a correlation 
matrix: principle factors, diagonal, centroid, minres 1 image and so on. 
The method that is used the most at present and that is widely available 
at computer installations is the principal factors method, The principle 
factors method is rnathematicall:f satisfying because it yields a mathe-
matically tmique solution of a factor problem, Perhaps its major 
volution feature is that it extracts a maximwn amount of variance as each 
factor is calculated. 
To show the logic of the principal factors method without consider-
able mathematics is difficult. One can achieve a certain intuitive 
understanding of the method however by approaching it geometrically. 
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Conceive test or variables as points in m-dimensional space. Variables 
that are highly and positively correlated should be near each other and 
away from variables with which they 1 do not correlate. 
is correct, there should be groups of points in space. 
If this reasoning 
Each of these 
points can be located in the space if suitable atXes are inserted into 
the space, one axis for each dimension of th~, m dimensions. Then any 
point's location is its multiple identificat~on obtained by reading its 
coordinates on the m axes. The factor probl~ is to project axes throurh 
neighboring groups of points and to so locate these axes that they 
account for as much of the variances of the variables and possible. 
The above description is figurative. Factor loadings are not read 
froM "reference axes; they are calculated using rather complex methods. 
The principal factor method actually involves the solution of simul-
taneous linear equations. The roots obtained from the solution are 
called eigenvalues. tigenvectors are also obtained9 after suitable 
transformation, they become "ttt\e factor loadings. 
Most factor analytic methods produce results in a form that is 
difficult or impossible to interpret. Thus it is usually necesl!lary to 
rotate factor matrices to interpret them adequately. The two main types 
of rotation are called "orthogonal" and "oblique". Orthogonal rotations 
maintain the independence of factors, that is, the angles between the 
axes are kept at 90 degrees. This means that the correlation between 
the factors is zero. Rotations in which the factor axes are allowed to 
form acute or obtuse angles are called oblique. Obliqueness, of course, 
neans that factors are correlated. 
Some researchers prefer to rotate orthogonally. Others insist that 
orthogonal rotation· is unrealistic, that actual factors are not usually 
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unco:rrelated and that rotations should confotm to reality. ·rwo remarks 
are relavent to this subject. One,' the type' of rotation seems to be a 
matter of t;a~te. Two• the researcher "'l!lhould ·1.irl'derstand both types of 
i 
rotation to the extent that he can interpret'both kinds of factors. He 
should be pnrticularly careful when confI"ont~d· with the I'eSUlts of 
oblique solutions, They contain pebuliari ties and subtleties not present 
in ot"thogonal solutions (Kerlinger 1973). 
Conm,uter Observation Structure for Factor Analysts 
• The factor analysis for this study utilized an International Mathe- · 
' I 
mati~al and Statistical Libraries (IMSL) program from the IMSL Library 
3, Edition 5 manual and was run on the Control Data Corporation (CDC) 
\ 
6600 computer. 
A Synopsis of the Purpose of Each of the Subroutines 
COEF - compute a matrix of factor score coefficients. 
COMH - compute an unrotated factor loading mat?'ix accordinr, to a 
common factor model by unweighted or generalized least 
squares ; or by na:ximurn likelihood procedures. 
HARR ... transforrnntion of an unrotated factor loading matrix to 
oblique ~xes by the Harlris-Kaiser method. 
!MAG - comnute an unrotated factor loading matrix acco?'ding to an 
irr:age model. 
PRL! - cor:rpute an unrotated factor loading matrix according to a 
princ::ipaJ com\)onent model. 
PROT - oblique tra;isformation of the factor loading matrix using a 
target matrix, including pivot and power vector options. 
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ROTA - orthogonal rotation of ~ factor loading matrix using a 
generalized orthomax cr\i,terion, including quartimax, var!-
max~ and equamax. 
SCHN - orthogonal transformatibn of the ·,factor loading matrix using 
a target matrix. 
SCOR - compute a set of factort scores given the factor score 
coefficient matrix. 
Featured Abilities 
With the factor analysis subroptines, a broad class of problems can 
be solved. It is convenient to approach the solution in five steps: 
~Step l - Calculate the correlation matrix R. 
! 
Step 2 - Calculate an unrotated factor loading matrix A (COMM, IMAG 
'" 
or PRIN). 
Step 3 - Calculate a rotated factor loading matrix B to enhance 
interpretability (HARR, PROT, ROTA or SCHN). 
Step 4 - If factor scores are desired, calculate the factor score 
coefficient matrix (COEF). 
Step 5 - Estimate the factor s7ores of a group of subjects (SCOR). 
The basic factor analysis proble1b is as follows: 
Suppose NV (number of variables, after an initial data transforrna-
tions) measurements on NT subjects have been made. 
Hr .factors that represent linear relationships among the observed 
variables are then constructed. The net result is either 
a. data reduction - .'.IF usually less than half of :lV and one 
has rnost of the "infornation" contain"'ld in the NV variables 
comnressed into NF factors. 
b. or a factor analysis mQdel of one of two kin els: 
1. taxonomic view - the fnctors ere merely convenient 
clusters of variables ( PR!i~ - principal components, 
computationally cheap) 
2. explanatory view - the facto!"s are causal in nature, 
118 
scientifically replicable and of theoretical interest, 
determining the correlation arnong the variables (COMM -
common factor, most expensive, but most powe!"ful; at a 
fraction of the cost of COMM, an image analysis may be 
performed that in the samplinp, li~i t is equivalent to 
common factor analvsis (IMAG)). 
' -
In factor analysis, as opposed to principal components, the diagonal 
of the correlation rr.atrix is replaced by the unique variances (or 
comMunalities), which •,:ill be less than un:i.ty. The squared multiple 
correlation of a variable with all of the other variables should be 
taken as a . .lower bound for the unique variance. COMM inputs initial 
estir.iates for the unique variances through vector V, while IMAG requires 
the user to replace the diagonal elements of the input correlation matrix 
R with the communality estimates. 
The result of step 2, then, is the unrotated factor .loadinr: matrix 
A=(a .. ), i=l, ••• ,l'IV and j=l, ••• ,MF, where a .. is the loading of variable 
l] lJ 
i on factor j. Each column of the matrix A co!"responds to one factor 
and contains the loadings. If the factors are statistically incependent, 
the factors are orthogonal. Otherwise• the factors are oblique. Note 
that all the loading sifns fori a factor may be reversed. 
The factors (loadings) obtained in step 2 are not unique. So in 
Step 3, the factors are transformed (rotated) to simplify the 
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' interpretation of the "physical significMce"' of each factor. Ideally• 
I 
a factor might have non•zero loadings on only a few variables (or 
I 
alternatively• perhaps each Yariable may be weighted on only a few 
factors). Several methods are available to calculate B, the rotated 
factor loading matrix. Transformed factors that ~~ orthogonpl 1 
(independent) may be obtained from ROTA or SCHN, and obliquely trans-
formed factors from HARR or PROT. A further distinction may be made 
stemminr. from any prior knowledge of the rotated loading matrix. No 
prior knowledge is referred to as a blind tratisformation. Prior know-
ledge is manifested in a target matrix and the terms subjective or 
Procrustean are applied to such procedures. .ROTAs HARR, and PROT (two 
optiOhs) are blind procedures while SCHN and PROT (third option) are 
subjective proceduries. 
In summary, an initial structure or unrotated factor loading matrix 
is calculated in step 2, Since most variables will be loaded on each 
factor, it is desired in step 3 to obtain a simple structure matrix, one 
with a greater number of large and zero loadings. Also the pattern 
matrix is calculated in step 3. If an orthogonal rotation is used in 
step 3, the structure and pattern m~trices will be identical~ 
Several executions of steps 2 ~d 3 may be requi!'ed to determine the 
number of factors NF, the appropriate model to use, ~d the ::otation 
method that results in interpretable loadings. Finally, for any subjects 
NF actual factor scores may be estimated using the subject's NV measure-
ments. COEF is used to obtain a factor score coefficient matrix that 
can be used to estimate factor scores for any subset of the original data 
(or new data) using SCOR. 
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Blocks of computation that may be perfol:'Med And options that are 
available are outlined in Figure 6. The step l c<ilculation of a correla-
tion matri~ may be· :r;>erfot'med by any correlation routine. The computa-
tion flow for the :r-esearch pro~lem is shown by the dash lines. 
Algorithms for the three steps are •s follows: 
Algorithm l - Correlation Matrix 
! 
Computation of the means of the M variables uses the following 
formula: 
where Xij is observation i on variable j and .N is the number of observa-
tions per variable, 
Standard deviations are computed using the following formula: 
N 
Sj· • '.E Xlj/(H .. l), j:l,2, ••• ,M, 
. i•l 
where, x1j•x1j-xj• 
Computation of the simple correlation coefficients of the M vari-
ables is done as follows: 
H 




h~ .. 15s1sj 
1 ' 
i=j 
Algorithm 2 - Principle Component 
The eigenvalues E=(ei) and eigenvectors Q=(qi) of the correlation 
matrix R, with e 1 e 2 ••• e~N' satisfy Rq1seiqi. The number of factors 
NF may be input, or determined by the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of the 
number of eigenvalues greater than unity. The unrotated component 
pattern matrix A is given by 
A _ Q nl/2 
- ~F. Jff ' 
where QNF is the matrix of the first NF columns of Q and DNF is a 
diagonal matrix of the largest Iff eigenvalues. 
Algorithm 3 - Orthogonal Rotation 
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The rotated factor loading matrix B=(bij) is matrix A, orthogonally 
transformed to make as man~r of the b~j coefficients as small in magni-
tude as possible. A general orthomax criterion f\mction is maximized: 
NF NF 
L. '£:: b~i ... w 
i=l j=l l.J 
NF (NV ·;2 ,. -.. 2 
.e...i .L b .. 
-j=l i=l l.J 
where b. . is the loading of variable i on orthogonally transformed factor 
1J 
j, and W is a parameter determinig the kind of solution to be computed. 
a. W = o.o is the Qu;:irtimax method, which atten:pts to get each 
variable to load highly on onl:r one (or a few) factor(s). 
b. W = l.O is the Varir.iax method, which atteM?t::3 to load highly 
a relatively low number of variables on i:;ach factor. Vari-
max is most iddely used. 
c. W = HF/2.0 is the Equamax method, which is a compromise of 
122 
of the al:>ove two. 
a. H can be ;my ri?al number., but best values lie in the inter.-
val [l.o, s.o<';NF]. Generally the Jarger W is, the more 
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